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Lenders and Land
Ann M. Burkhart*

Using land to secure loans has been a particularly durable human
institution. Mortgages' have existed since antiquity, 2 primarily because land
generally retains its value and is permanent and immovable. In societies with
largely nonmonetary economies, such as feudal England, land also has been
particularly valued as a source of livelihood and of power. Therefore, land has
been and continues to be desirable security for loans.
To retain its utility throughout the centuries, the mortgage necessarily has
evolved to reflect changing legal and economic conditions. As is to be expected,
the modem American mortgage creates some very different rights and liabilities
than the forms of security used during the earliest common law, when physical
battle was a legally prescribed means of determining the existence of a debt and
mortgage.3 In one very important respect, however, the modem mortgagee is
becoming increasingly more like its feudal counterpart. Substantial economic
and legal incentives now exist, as they did during the early common law period,
for a mortgagee to be concerned with and knowledgeable about the condition
and use of the mortgaged land.
In fact, the mortgagee's relationship to the mortgaged land now has entered

its third era. The first era began with the earliest forms of common law
mortgages in the twelfth century and ran until the late sixteenth and early
* © Ann M. Burkhart, Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School.
With special thanks to Professors Daniel A. Farber, Michael H. Tonry, and Dale A.
Whitman for their valuable comments on a draft of this Article.
1. For ease of reference, the term "mortgage" will be used throughout this Article
to refer generically to all forms of real estate security. Although the various types of real
estate security and the documents by which they are created differ, those differences are
irrelevant to the discussion in this Article, except where specifically noted otherwise.
2. See LEONARD A. JONES, THE LAW OF MORTGAGES OF REAL PROPERTY § 1 (8th
ed. 1928).
3. See RANULF DE GLANVILL, A TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE

REALM OF ENGLAND bk. x, ch. 12 (G.D.G. Hall trans., 1965). In fact, battle was the
"normal method of trying title to land in feudal and in royal courts." Id. at 180.
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seventeenth centuries. This era was marked largely by the absence of an
established and standardized money economy in England and by a prohibition
on charging interest. During this period, lenders' return on investments flowed
directly from the encumbered land. The lender took possession of the land and
legally was entitled to its economic and legal benefits. As the mortgage
relationship evolved during this era, it increasingly focused on the lender's rights
in the encumbered land. In fact, the mortgage's true nature became obscured by
the trappings of ownership afforded the mortgagee.
The first era ended when lenders were permitted to charge interest on loans
and an increasingly strong money economy became established in England.
During the second era, which has continued into this century, the pendulum has
swung in the opposite direction. Lenders and the law increasingly have shifted
focus from the encumbered land to the debt. The second era has been marked
by efforts to facilitate and to expand the capital markets and trade. Two prime
examples are the creation of holder-in-due-course status and creation of the
secondary mortgage market. An increasingly attenuated relationship between
the lender and the mortgaged land has been a hallmark of this second era.
The third era is now underway. Just as economic forces caused the
mortgagee's relationship with the encumbered land to attenuate, social forces are
now causing it to contract. The enormously expensive problem of treating
hazardous waste sites and the imposition of cleanup costs on lenders have been
substantial and visible factors in the new era. The laws concerning hazardous
waste are only one example of the current process of evolution in this country
from protecting private property and contract rights to protecting the common
good. Attempts to deter crime also have made property forfeitures a substantial
concern for lenders. The enormity of these and other societal problems are
causing governments that are attempting to deal with them to impose costs on
mortgagees or to interfere with or destroy mortgage interests. In the face of
these new realities, prudent lenders are increasingly vigilant about which
properties they will accept as. security for a loan and about the activities
conducted on the properties both before and during the life of the loan.
This Article will demonstrate the changing nature of the mortgagee's
relationship with the land during each era. The Article will show that, like
humans, common law mortgages have been in a state of evolution since their
first appearance. Also like humans, more recent mortgage forms are not
necessarily superior to earlier mortgage forms; they simply have adapted to their
environment.
I. THE FIRST ERA
The first era of mortgages was defined by a prohibition on charging interest.

During this era, the Church prohibited Christian lenders from charging interest.
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The Church characterized an agreement to pay interest as a form of usury.4 As

described in Glanvill's twelfth-century treatise on English law, a Christian lender
who died while holding a debt on which interest was payable died as a sinner.
As such, his personal property was forfeited to the king and his land reverted to
the lord of the fee, rather than descending to his heirs. Bracton describes the
same prohibition in his thirteenth-century treatise on English law and customs,6
and statutes enacted in the fourteenth7 and fifteenth centuries s continued this
prohibition.
Charging interest was prohibited to prevent economic exploitation of people
who were unable or unwilling to live within their means. At this time, lenders
had few opportunities to lend money for trade or for other economically
productive activities because of the undeveloped state of England's trade
economy. Therefore, lenders' primary source of income was from necessitous
individuals. In response, the Church and the State acted to protect those in need
from lenders.9
Due to the prohibition on charging interest and the limited number of
property interests recognized during this period, the key feature of each type of
mortgage used during the first era was the lender's possession of the encumbered
land. Despite the debt relationship that was the obvious basis for the lender's
right to possess, the lawyers of this era struggled to fit the lender's interest within
one of the recognized estates in land. As a result, as security interests evolved,
they moved further from their actual character-a lien-to an artificially
characterized fee ownership.
During the first era of mortgages, land security arrangements evolved
through three primary forms-the Glanvillian gage, the Bractonian mortgage,
and the Littletonian gage. The earliest security arrangement to gain widespread
acceptance was the gage, which Glanvill described in his treatise on English law.
Glanvill described two types of gage: the vifgage ("living pledge") and the
mort gage ("dead pledge").' Both types of gage authorized the lender to take
possession of the pledged land and to collect the rents and profits. In fact, the
lender's possession of the pledged land was an essential element of each type of

4. The courts of law did not prohibit charging interest because it was a matter of
private contract. See ALFRED W. B. SIMPSON, AN

INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE

LAND LAW 132 (1961).

5. See GLANVILL, supranote 3, bks. vii, x, chs. 8, 16; see also Harold D. Hazeltine,
The Gage ofLand in MedievalEngland, 17 HARV. L. REv. 549, 552 (1904).
6. See 2 HENRICI DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND fols.
116b-1 17, at 328-32 (George E. Woodbine ed. & Samuel E. Thome trans., 1968).

7. See 15 Edw. 3, st. 1 ch. 5 (1342) (Eng.).
8. See Hen. 8, chs. 5, 6 (1509) (Eng.).
9. See 8 WILLIAM

S. HOLDSWORTH,

A HISTORY

OF ENGLISH LAW

101-02 (2d ed.

1937).
10.

GLANVILL,

supra note 3, bk. x,

chs. 6-11. See also 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK &
119 (2d ed. 1898).

FREDERICK MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
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gage: "If delivery of the pledge itself do not follow, the king's court is not
accustomed to take cognizance of private agreements of this kind.""
The lender's possession of the land served three important needs that arose
from the relative infancy of the common law of land. First, in the absence of a

land recording system, possession was the primary method by which the lender
manifested and protected its interest in the land. "As long as the administration
of justice is slow, weak and formal, the creditor will secure himself by that
possession which is said of old to be nine points in the law."' 2 The lender's
possession also prevented further pledges of the land; by possessing the property,
the lender put potential future lenders on notice of its prior interest. 3
Second, taking possession of the property and collecting the rents and
profits was a thinly disguised means of avoiding the prohibition on interest.
Although a vifgage required the lender to apply the rents and profits to reduce
the outstanding debt, a mort gage did not. Instead, the lender could keep the
rents and profits with no obligation to account to the borrower for them. 4
Unsurprisingly, the mortgage was the more frequently used gage.
The third reason for the lender's possession of the pledged land was to
facilitate the lender's remedy upon default. If a borrower defaulted and did not
cure the default within any court-ordered redemption period, title to the land was
forfeited to the lender.' 5 The forfeiture occurred regardless of the land's value
in relation to the outstanding debt and regardless of the value of the rents and
profits that the lender had collected during the life of the gage. Under these
circumstances, it would not be surprising if a borrower were less than
cooperative in recognizing the lender's rights to the land. If the lender was

11.

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

160 n.38

(W.Lewis ed., 1902). See also I GARRARD GLENN, MORTGAGES, DEEDS OF TRUST, AND
OTHER SECURITY DEVICES AS To LAND § 2, at 4 (1943).
12. William H. Lloyd, Mortgages-The Genesisof the Lien Theory, 32 YALE L.J.
233, 235 (1923).
13. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at 160.
14. This treatment of rents and profits was the primary distinction between the vif

gage and the mort gage and is the source of the names for the two different gages.
Because the holder of a vifgage was required to apply the rents and profits to the debt,
the pledge was "living." The mort gage, on the other hand, was "dead" because the

pledged property was not generating a benefit for the owner. See GLANVILL, supra note
3, bk. x, ch. 8.
15. If the gage contract included a forfeiture clause specifying that title would vest
in the lender upon default, the forfeiture automatically occurred upon default without
court action. If the gage contract did not include a forfeiture clause, the lender would
acquire title by means of a court action in which the court determined the enforceability
of the gage and of the default. As an early recognition that the lender's primary interest
should be in repayment of the debt and not in retention of the land, the court would
condition forfeiture on the borrower's failure to cure the default within a court-specified
redemption period. See GLANVILL, supra note 3, bk. x, chs. 6-8.
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already in possession, however, no legal action would be necessary to enforce
the borrower's forfeiture of title.
Paradoxically, although the lender was legally required to take possession
of the property to create a valid gage, the law did not protect this possession.
The lender was characterized as having seisin, but only a limited forr-seisina
et de vadio ("seisin by way of pledge"). Because of this limited interest, the
lender had no cause of action if its possession was disturbed by a stranger to the
title or even by the borrower in violation of the gage contract. 6 Glanvill seemed
to justify this result on the ground that the lender's real interest was in the debt
and not in the land. 7 Other commentators have theorized that the lack of
protection was attributable either to the early stage of development of the
possessory actions, which protected only freehold estates,18 or to the connection
between the mortgage and usury. 9
Whatever the reason, the lack of protection for the lender's possession was
a substantial defect in the Glanvillian gage's utility. As a consequence of this
problem, medieval conveyancers sought to recast the security relationship in the
thirteenth century by retaining those features of the gage that were attractive to
lenders-the rights to possess the secured land and to collect rents and
profits-and by eliminating the gage's objectionable feature-the absence of
protection for the lender's possession. To be protectable, the interest had to be
legally recognized. Therefore, choosing from the limited estates in land
recognized at this time, lawyers recast the security transaction as a grant to the
lender of a long term for years, such as five hundred or one thousand years,
subject to the condition that the term for years would be void upon repayment. 0

16. Glanvill comments:
If the creditor loses seisin of his gage, whether by act of the debtor or of
someone else, he shall not recover seisin of it with the aid of the court, not
even by a recognition of novel disseisin. For if he has been disseised of his
gage unjustly and without a judgment by someone other than the debtor, the"
debtor himself may have an assize of novel disseisin. If, on the other hand,
he was disseised by the debtor himself, the court will not aid him to recover
the gage from the debtor or to re-enter except through the debtor, for the
creditor should have recourse to the principal plea to constrain the debtor to
make satisfaction to him for his debt ....
GLANVILL, supra note 3, bk. x, ch. 11. See also 2 POLLOCK & MAILAND, supra note 10,
at 120-21; H.W. Chaplin, The Story of MortgageLaw, 4 HARv. L. REV. 1, 7 (1890);
Hazeltine, supra note 5, at 555.
17. See GLANVILL, supra note 3, bk. x, ch. 11.
18. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 10, at 120-21.
19. See SIMPSON, supra note 4, at 133.
20. See 3 BRACTON, supra note 6, fol. 268, at 285. In some cases, the lender
immediately reconveyed the right to possess to the borrower, subject to forfeiture of title
if the borrower defaulted. See GEORGE OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
MORTGAGES § 4, at 7 (2d ed. 1970); JOHN J. POWELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF

MORTGAGES 11-14 (4th ed. 1799).
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This mortgage counterpart is called the Bractonian mortgage because it is
described in Bracton's thirteenth-century treatise on English law and customs.
As with the Glanvillian gage, the holder of a Bractonian mortgage was
entitled to possess the encumbered land and to collect its rents and profits. Also
like the Glanvillian gage, the lender acquired fee title to the property if the
borrower defaulted. Because the Bractonian mortgage conveyed a recognized
estate in land to the lender, its right to possess was legally protected.2 Although
possession by the lender was not an essential feature of the Bractonian mortgage,
as it had been for the Glanvillian gage, possession of the property was still an
essential aspect of the transaction because of the continuing prohibition against
charging interest on loans.'
Although the Bractonian mortgage successfully provided lenders with a
protected right ofpossession, it fell into disuse because courts eventually refused
to enforce the forfeiture clause according to its terms. As property law evolved
toward stricter notions of seisin, courts increasingly had conceptual difficulties
justifying the transformation of a leasehold, which was characterized as a chattel
real, into a fee estate, which could be created only by formal livery of seisin.23
Therefore, courts began characterizing the lender's interest in the land after
default as a term for years, rather than as a fee estate.24 In response, lenders
began including a provision in the mortgage that the borrower would convey fee
title to the lender upon default.' This solution proved to be less than satisfactory
as lenders had difficulties enforcing this provision against a borrower who had
lost a parcel of land worth potentially far more than the outstanding debt.
In response to this development, Littleton recast the loan transaction in
approximately 1475. The Littletonian gage became the predominant form of real
property security during this time and is the direct forerunner of the modem
mortgage. Like Glanvill, Littleton adopted the term mortgage. The difference
between Glanvill's and Littleton's explanations for this term's origin, however,
demonstrated the increasing focus of the mortgage relationship on the
encumbered land, rather than on the debt. Glanvill stated that a gage was "a
dead gage (mortgage) . . .when the fruits and rents accruing during its

continuance do not count towards repayment of the loan."26 Littleton, on the
other hand, stated that the term mortgage described the effect of the borrower's

21. Particularly in its earliest period of use, however, a Bractonian mortgage did
not protect the lender's possession completely. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supranote
10, at 106-10
22. See OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 5, at 8
23. See LITrLETON'S TENURES §§ 59, 349 (Eugene Wambaugh ed., 1903);
SIMPSON, supra note 4, at 133; Hazeltine, supra note 5, at 556.
24. See EDWARD COKE, COMMENTARY UPON LITrLETON 216-18 (16th ed. 1809);
2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 10, at 122-23; POWELL, supranote 20, at 11-12.
25. See POWELL, supra note 20, at 11-14.

26. GLANVILL, supranote 3, bk. x, ch. 6.
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default: if the borrower defaults, "then the land which is put in pledge ...is
taken from him for ever, and so dead [to him] ....
The increasing focus on the land also is evident in the interest and rights a
Littletonian gage gave a lender. The lender acquired fee title to the pledged land
by formal livery of seisin. 2' Although the borrower retained a right of re-entry,
that right did not constitute an estate in land.29 If the borrower defaulted, the
lender's title to the land became absolute. The borrower was not even accorded
the right of redemption to prevent forfeiture of title that Glanvillian gagors had
enjoyed almost three hundred years earlier.30

Although the essence of the relationship between the borrower and the
lender was merely a debt relationship, the law closed its eyes to the true
character of the transaction and accorded the lender all the rights of fee
ownership. As with the Glanvillian gage and the Bractonian mortgage, the
lender enjoyed the rights to possess the property and to collect the rents and
profits.3 ' Additionally, the lender's wife had a dower interest in the land; the
lender was entitled to compensation if the land was taken by eminent domain;
at his death, the land passed by his will, through intestate succession, or escheat;
and the lender's creditors could seize the land.32 The law blinded itself so
thoroughly to the true reason for the lender's acquisition of fee title that the gage
entitled the lender to exercise the franchise, which was limited at this time to
freeholders.33
The Littletonian gage, therefore, was the culmination of a process by which
the borrower and lender's relationship increasingly shifted from its true character
and invested the lender with greater rights in the borrower's land. With the
Glanvillian gage, the lender's right to possess the land was legally recognized
but was not protected against even the gagor's wrongful conduct. The
Bractonian mortgage conveyed a protected chattel real to the lender, which

27. LrrrLETON'S TENuREs, supra note 23, § 332.
28. See LITrLETON's TENURES, supra note 23, § 332; see also 2 BLACKSTONE,

supra note 11, at 157-58.
29. See COKE, supra note 24, at 218; RICHARD W. TURNER, THE EQUITY OF
REDEMPTION 11 (1931).

30. See OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 5, at 9.
31. See TURNER,supra note 28, at 88-90. As with the Glanvillian gage, Littleton
distinguished between the mortgageand the vivum vadium. Although charging interest

still constituted usury, the mortgagewas "much more common[ly]" used than the vivum
vadium. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at 157. Moreover, although rents and profits
were supposed to be applied to reduce the debt, Osborne states that the lender "almost
certainly... made a surreptitious profit. The ability thus to circumvent the mandate
against taking interest doubtless was a potent factor in the popularity of this form of
security." OSBORNE, supra note 20 § 5, at 8 (footnote omitted).
32. See OSBORNE, supranote 20, § 5, at 9-10; Lloyd, supra note 12, at 239-40; see
also LIrLETON'S TENUREs, supra note 23, § 357.

33. See OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 5, at 10.
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initially could convert to fee ownership. The Littletonian gage took the final step
by conveying fee title to the lender with virtually all the rights attendant on such
ownership.
The differences among these security arrangements, however, are less
important than their similarities. For each type, the lender's right to possess the
property, to collect the rents and profits, and to become the full fee owner if the
borrower defaulted created obvious incentives for the lender to become
knowledgeable about the land and to maintain it.
Beyond this economic incentive to enhance the land's value and
productivity, the law created substantial additional incentives for the lender to
be concerned with the property's condition. From an early date, a lender who
possessed a borrower's land was legally liable for its condition. From at least the
twelfth century, the lender was liable to the borrower for waste.' In describing
the lender's duty with respect to pledged land, Glanvill stated:
[The creditor] is bound to keep the gage safely and not use it or deal
with it anyway to its detriment. If any deterioration occurs during the
fixed term while it is in the creditor's keeping and as a result of his
fault, the value of the deterioration will be set off against the debt.
When the debtor has repaid the debt, the creditor must restore to
him in its original condition the thing gaged; and it will afford him no
defense against the debtor that the thing was lost or damaged by
accident while in his keeping, because he is strictly bound either to
restore the thing gaged or make satisfaction for it, or else to lose his
3
debt. 1
...

Glanvill clearly states that a lender is liable for voluntary waste, which is waste
caused by the lender's actions. He is less clear that a lender is liable for
permissive waste, which results from inaction, such as a failure to maintain.
Glanvill does state that the lender must "keep the gage safely," which indicates
liability for permissive, as well as voluntary, waste. He also states that the
property must be restored to the debtor "in its original condition" and that the
debt will be reduced "[i]f any deterioration occurs." Although Glanvill refers to
deterioration resulting from the lender's "fault," the word "fault" generally
includes a wrongful omission, as well as a wrongful act.36 Therefore, a strong

34. The earliest written record of actions for waste is in 1177. See Sue Sheridan
Walker, The Action of Waste in the Early Common Law, in LEGAL RECORDS AND THE
HISTORIAN 185,185 (J.H. Baker ed., 1975).
35. GLANVILL, supra note 3, bk. x, chs. 6, 8. Although the quoted language deals
with a gage of personal property, Glanvill states that the rules are the same for gages of
land. See GLANVILL, supra note 3, bk. x, ch. 8.
36. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 608 (6th ed. 1990).

1999]

LENDERS AND LAND

argument can be made that a lender in possession of the borrower's property had
a duty to maintain it and also to prevent other forms of permissive waste.
As a tenant for a term, a Bractonian mortgagee, like a Glanvillian gagee,
was liable for waste, and an action for waste was a common remedy by the end
of the thirteenth century.37 A lender who used the property "to the extent of
rightful estovers... thus commits no waste or injuriaby using within measure.
But if he exceeds due measure by using and taking more than rightful estovers,
he uses so to speak, another's property, and the waste will be wrongful ....38
Like Glanvill, Bracton does not expressly state that liability existed for both
permissive and voluntary waste.39 However, laws enacted in 1267, 1278, and
1292 made tenants, such as lenders, liable for both kinds of waste. 40 A lender
also could be held liable for waste committed by a third party.4' Because the law
enacted in 1278 provided that the penalty for waste during a tenancy was
forfeiture of the property and, in some cases, treble damages, 42 a Bractonian
mortgagee obviously had substantial incentives to maintain the property and to
protect it from harm by others.
In contrast, as a matter of title theory, a Littletonian gagee should not have
been liable for waste because the borrower did not retain an estate in land, and
the courts of law so held. By this point in the development of the common law,
however, Chancery began to adjust lenders' and borrowers' rights and liabilities
to reflect more accurately the substance of the security relationship. Therefore,
although the Littletonian gagee was accorded virtually all the rights of fee
ownership, equity imposed liability for waste on him.43
The Littletonian gagee also could be held liable for nuisance for conditions
on the gaged land. Liability could be imposed not only for conditions created

37. See Walker, supranote 34, at 185.
38. 3 BRACTON, supranote 6, fol. 316b, at 409. See S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 292 (2d ed. 1981), for a description of a 1368

decision in which a tenant for life or for years was held liable for waste for burning down
a house.

39. A reference in Bracton indicates that a possessor was liable for permissive
waste. In his discussion of a dower holder's defense in an action for waste, Bracton
states: "[Or] she may acknowledge that if houses have fallen in on account of age, she
built better ones there ....
." 3

BRACTON,

supra note 6, fol. 315b, at 406. This example

implies that a possessor was liable if a building had "fallen in on account of age" unless
she has rebuilt the building. Because property possessors are not obligated to reverse the

effects of normal depreciation, this example apparently refers to damage caused by a
failure to maintain.
40. "For above five hundred years past all tenants for life or for any less estate,
have been punishable or liable to be impeached for waste both voluntary and
permissive." 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at 283.
41. See COKE, supra note 24, at 53, 54.
42. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supranote 11, at 283; Walker, supranote 34, at 189-91.
43. See POWELL, supra note 20, at 248-49.
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by the gagee, but also for pre-existing conditions, 4 which created a substantial
incentive for a lender to inspect land before becoming a gagee. In contrast, a
Glanvillian gagee was not liable for nuisance, though a private nuisance action
had existed since the twelfth century.45 In Glanvill's treatise, nuisance was
categorized with the Assize of Novel Disseisin and was conceptualized as an
interference with another property owner's seisin.4 6 This link between nuisance
and seisin protected a Glanvillian gagee from liability because he did not have
seisin 7 Similarly, a Bractonian mortgagee, as a termor rather than fee owner,
originally was not liable for nuisance. 8 However, when the action on the case
for nuisance replaced the assize for nuisance in the fifteenth century, the
Bractonian mortgagee, like the Littletonian gagee, was liable for nuisance.4 9
This legal liability for nuisance and for waste, together with the lender's
substantial economic self-interest in maximizing both the land's rents and profits
during the life of the 16an and the land's value in case the lender acquired it on
the borrower's default, made the land and the lender's relationship to it defining
elements of the mortgage's first era. The chief underlying reasons were the
Church's prohibition on charging interest and the relatively undeveloped state

44. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at 221; 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra
note 10, at 55.
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D cmt. a (1979).
46. See GLANVILL, supra note 3, bk. xiii, chs. 32-36. In one of the writs for
nuisance, for example, Glanvill describes the altering of a river bank "to the nuisance of
N's free tenement." See GLANVILL, supra note 3, bk. xiii, ch. 35; see also 3
BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at 222; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 10, at 53.
Although originally categorized with the Assize of Novel Disseisin, by the thirteenth
century the nuisance action increasingly was called an assize of nuisance. See GLANVILL,
supra note 3, bk. xiii, ch. 34 n. 1; S.F.C. Milsom, Forwardto 1 POLLOCK &MAITLAND,
supra note 10, at xlii.
47. Milsom states: "The reason for this must have been as obvious at the time as
it has been obscure ever since." Milsom, supra note 46, at xliii. He presents an
interesting hypothesis that the Assize for Novel Disseisin was not designed to protect in
rem rights, such as possession, but to protect a feudal tenant in his relationship with his
lord. As such, the Assize could not be used by or against a Glanvillian gagee. Similarly,
the Assize was inapplicable to a Bractonian mortgagee. Although the mortgagee was a
tenant, he was not a tenant in the feudal sense. See Milsom supra note 46, at xliii-xlv.
48. Bracton states that, to bring a nuisance action, "the plaintiff must have a free
tenement, for no one may acquire a servitude attached to an estate or land unless he has
an estate and a free tenement, nor may anyone be subject to a servitude unless he who has
an estate and a free tenement." 3 BRACTON, supra note 6, fol. 234, at 195. He also
states: "A nuisance ... does not differ substantially from a disseisin.... [T]he nuisance
may be removed and damages restored to the plaintiff, both for the disseisin of his
tenement and for the nuisance...." 3 BRACTON, supra note 6, fol. 232, at 190. See also
Milsom, supra note 46, at xliii.
49. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at 222. The first reference to a termor's
action on the case was in 1469. See William A. McRae, Jr., The Development of
Nuisance in the Early Common Law, 1 U. FLA. L. REv. 27, 42 (1948).
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of the land laws. As will be discussed in the next section of this Article, the
mortgage's second era has been defined by a shift in focus from the encumbered
land to the secured debt.
II. THE SECOND ERA
The second era of mortgage law began during the late sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries as the English economy made the transition from
feudalism to mercantilism. Two legal changes, in particular, reversed the
traditional primacy of the mortgage over the debt: (1) Parliament repealed the
prohibition on charging interest, which enhanced the debt's value, and (2)
Chancery recast the mortgage relationship by creating the equity of redemption,
which increasingly diminished the value of the lender's interest in the mortgaged
land. The trends that marked the beginning of the second era have continued
into the twentieth century. Mortgage securitizations and other developments
have removed mortgagees ever further from the encumbered land, while holderin-due-course status has continued to enhance the debt's value.
A. Ascendance of the Debt

During the first era of mortgage law, England did not have an established
monetary economy for several reasons. First, during much of the Middle Ages,
no uniform national currency existed. 0 Second, money was scarce. For
example, during Richard I's reign, the total money supply consisted of
approximately one shilling for each person subject to his reign.51 Third,
counterfeiting and "clipping" (cutting off the edges of a coin) were rampant.52
Fourth, a great deal of the coinage was made of tin, which rapidly deteriorated.53
Fifth, the value of coins and their foreign exchange rates were set not by market
forces but by European rulers to effectuate political goals.54 These problems
were aggravated by the ban on usury, which distorted the European money
markets and increased the demand for coins.
In contrast, the second era began with the dawning of the English monetary
economy. With the "discovery" of America, England began importing large
quantities of precious metals from this continent.56 As a result, the quantity of

50. See ALEXANDER DEL MAR, HISTORY OF MONETARY SYSTEMS 239 (Augustus

M. Kelley ed., 1969) (1895).
51. See id. at 240.
52. See GLYN DAVIES, A HISTORY OF MONEY: FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE

PRESENT DAY 169-70 (1994); DEL MAR, supra note 50, at 240-42.

53. See DEL MAR, supra note 50, at 240-41.
54. See WILLIAM A. SHAW, THE HISTORY OF CURRENCY 47, 59-60 (2d ed. 1967).

55. See DAVIES, supra note 52, at 173.
56. See SHAW, supra note 54, at 61.
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English currency steadily increased and, with it, England's foreign trade. 7 The
increased amount of currency had a dramatic impact in England. It caused the
"commercial and national, yea even literary, growth and expansion, which have
made the Elizabethan age the glory of [England's] history.""8
To further stimulate trade and, thereby, to increase England's power,
Parliament began loosening restrictions on interest. Parliament recognized that
loaned money could now be used in trade for productive, as well as
consumptive, purposes.59 But continuing questions about the morality of
charging interest inhibited Parliament from completely repealing the ban.
Instead, Parliament repealed the ban piecemeal in an attempt to protect the needy
from exploitation and at the same time to stimulate trade.60
61
In 1623, Parliament eliminated the last prohibitions on charging interest,
and the full effect of the English economy's monetization was felt in the area of
real estate lending. Because lenders no longer had to take possession of the
encumbered land to make a return on their loans, they increasingly permitted
borrowers to retain possession until a default occurred. This practice took hold
so rapidly that by the middle of the century, borrowers customarily retained
possession. 62 The legal significance of this fundamental change in the mortgage
relationship is demonstrated by Parliament's restoration of the franchise to
mortgagors in 1696.63 As noted above, Parliament had given the franchise,

which was limited to freeholders, to secured lenders during the era of the
Littletonian gage.6
The repeal of the ban on interest and the related increase in trade triggered
another important development that substantially promoted debt's ascendancy
in the mortgage relationship-the extensive use of negotiable instruments. 65 An
early form of negotiable instrument had been used in England during the Middle
Ages.6 However, it was not until the years immediately after Parliament's
repeal of the ban on interest that a negotiable instrument-the bill of
exchange-came to be widely used.67

57. See SHAW, supranote 54, at 119.
58. See SHAW, supra note 54, at 133.

59. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
60. See 8 HOLDSWORTH, supranote 9, at 103-12.
61. 21 Jam. 1, ch. 17, § 2 (1624), made permanent, 3 Car. 1, ch. 4, § 5 (1627)
(Eng.).
62. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supranote 11, at 159; 3 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON
REAL PROPERTY 438, at 37-39 (1997).
63. See Lloyd, supra note 12, at 239.
64. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
65. See 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 112.
66. Early forms of negotiable instruments existed in England by 1300. See
Frederick K. Beutel, The Development ofNegotiableInstruments in EarlyEnglish Law,
51 HARV. L. REv. 813, 830 (1938).
67. "[I]t is clear that between 1622 and 1651 very great advances had been made
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Negotiable instruments were particularly valuable in trade because they
were safer and easier to transport than precious metals, whether in the form of
coins or bullion.68 As a result, commercial practices directed the course of the
bill's development. To enhance the bill's utility, mercantile custom provided
special protections for the bona fide purchaser of a bill. 69 As is often the case,
however, the law lagged behind practice, and the common law at this time did
not provide similar protections. However, by the end of the century, the
common law had yielded to mercantile custom and had laid the foundation for
modem holder-in-due-course status.
The transformation began with Chief Justice Holt's 1696 decision inHussey
v. Jacob.7" Holt said in that case that an assignee of a bill of exchange could
enforce it even though the original holder could not because the underlying debt,
being a gaming debt, was legally void. He stated that a contrary rule "would be
' One year later, Lord Chancellor Somers applied the
very prejudicial to trade."71
same principle in the Court of Chancery in a case in which a bill of exchange
had been given without consideration. Somers held that the bona fide purchaser
of the instrument could enforce it: "[The purchaser] being an honest creditor and
coming by this bill fairly for the satisfaction of a just debt, [the Chancellor]
would not relieve against him, because it would tend to destroy trade which is
carried on every where by bills of exchange . ... 72

In 1699, Holt added another brick to the foundation. In a case he decided
that year, he held that if the holder of a bill payable to him or to the bearer lost
the bill, he could not recover it from a third party to whom the finder had sold
the bill. Holt gave only one reason--"by reason of the course of trade, which
creates a property in the assignee or bearer."" The "course of trade" was
mercantile practice. 74
towards making the bill of exchange a negotiable instrument." 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 9, at 155.
68. See 8 HOLDSWORTH, supranote 9, at 112; see also Grant Gilmore, Formalism
and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441, 448 (1979) ("[A]
draft on a ranking London house was a much safer as well as a much more convenient
thing to have than a bag-full of clipped Maria Theresa dollars.").
69. See 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 157.
70. 1 Comyns 4 (1696).
71. Id. at 5.

72. 1 Comyns 43 (1697).
73. 1 Salk 126 (1699).
74. "The assignability of bills of exchange payable to order was fully recognized;
and many of the other rules relating to them were so contrary to the ordinary principles
of the common law, that they could only be justified by a reference to mercantile

custom." 8

HOLDSWORTH,

supra note 9, at 170. One commentator states that the

common law courts adopted the law merchant because of the courts' "inadequacy to deal
with the subject matter .... " Beutel, supra note 66, at 837-38. The common law courts
had not wrested jurisdiction for cases involving commercial paper from the admiralty and
staple courts until the seventeenth century. See Beutel, supranote 66, at 837-38; see also
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Despite the increasing importance of trade and of the use of negotiable
instruments, the courts rather inexplicably refused to extend these protections
from bills of exchange to promissory notes? 5 Therefore, in 1704, Parliament did
so in the Statute of Anne.' As with bills of exchange, the reason for protecting
purchasers of promissory notes was to facilitate trade. Lingering questions
remained, however, about the scope of the protection.78
These questions became more pressing with the advent of the Industrial
Revolution in England. Just as the importation of precious metals from America
had spurred English trade, the Industrial Revolution now greatly expanded it79
and intensified the need for protected forms of negotiable instruments. To
satisfy this need, bona fide purchasers had to be shielded not only from
conflicting ownership claims, but also from contract defenses."
Lord Mansfield recognized this need and firnly ensconced protection for
bona fide purchasers in the common law in two key decisions. In Miller v.
Race,8' he cut off all claims of ownership that conflicted with the bona fide
purchaser's claim. In upholding a note purchaser's ownership against a claim
that a prior possessor had stolen it, Lord Mansfield clearly stated the commercial
considerations that underlay his decision:
[Bank notes] are not goods, not securities, nor documents for debts,
nor are so esteemed; but are treated as money, as cash, in the ordinary
course and transaction of business, by the general consent ofmankind;

J. MILNES HOLDEN, THE HISTORY OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN ENGLISH LAW 65

(1955).
75. See 8 HOLDSWORTH, supranote 9, at 172-73; Beutel, supranote 66, at 839.
76. 3, 4 Anne ch. 9 (1704): "An Act for giving like Remedy upon Promissory
Notes, as is now used upon Bills of Exchange ......
77. See 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 176; see also JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON PROMISSORY NOTES 6-7 (1845):
As commerce... advanced in its progress, the multiplicity of its concerns
required, in many instances, a less complicated mode of payment than by
Bills of Exchange. A trader, whose situation and circumstances rendered
credit from the merchant or manufacturer, who supplied him with.goods,
absolutely necessary, might have so limited a connection with the commercial
world at large, that he could not easily funlish his creditor with a Bill of
Exchange on another man. But his own responsibility might be such, that his
simple promise of payment, reduced to writing for the purpose of evidence,
might be accepted with equal confidence, as a bill on another trader. Hence,
it may reasonably be conjectured, Promissory Notes were at first introduced.

Id. (quoting KYD ON BILLS 18).
78.
79.
80.
81.

See Beutel, supra note 66, at 832.
See Gilmore, supra note 68, at 447.
See Gilmore, supra note 68, at 448-49.
1 Burr. 452 (1758).
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which gives them the credit and currency of money, to all intents and
purposes.
A bank note is constantly and universally, bothat home and abroad,
treated as money, as cash; and paid and received as cash; and it is
necessary, for the purposes of commerce, that their currency should
be established and secured. 2
Twenty-three years later, Mansfield held in Peacockv. Rhodes83 that a bona fide
purchaser takes free of all personal defenses that could have been asserted
against the original note holder. His stated reason was to protect the market in
negotiable instruments. The English courts thereafter consistently protected
bona fide purchasers, and by the mid-nineteenth century, the law concerning
negotiable instruments was virtually identical to today's law. 5
Most American states adopted the Statute of Anne8 6 and the special
protection afforded bona fide purchasers in England. 7 When the 1882 English
Bills of Exchange Act replaced the term "bona fide purchaser" with "holder in
due course," the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law of 1896 ("NIL"), which
was adopted throughout the United States, incorporated the change. That term
and the protection it connotes have continued through to modem law as
important parts of NIL's successor, Article Three of the Uniform Commercial
Code. 8
Although some modem commentators question whether holder-in-duecourse status actually facilitates trade in goods,89 it has facilitated trade in
negotiable instruments. In 1996 alone, the secondary market bought $799.6
billion in home mortgage loans. 90 As will be described in the next section, the
phenomenal growth of this market constitutes the culmination of the second era

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 457, 459.
2 Dougl. 633 (1781).
See id. at 636.
See Gilmore, supra note 68, at 448.
See STORY, supra note 77, at 9.
See STORY, supra note 77, at 11.
See Gilmore, supra note 66, at 449 n.14, 457,461.
89. See, e.g., Albert J. Rosenthal, Negotiability- Who Needs It?, 71 COLUM. L.
REV. 375, 401 (1971); John Evan Jones, Comment, ConsumerProtection- The Role
of Cut-OffDevices in Consumer Financing,1968 WIS. L. REV. 505, 525-26. But see
William H. Lawrence & John H. Minan, The Effect ofAbrogating the Holder-in-DueCourse Doctrine on the Commercializationof Innovative ConsumerProducts,64 B.U.
L. REV. 325, 327-29 (1984); Ralph J. Rohner, Holder in Due Course in Consumer
Transactions: Requiem, Revival, or Reformation?, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 503, 534-38
(1975).
90. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING &URBAN DEv., SURVEY OF MORTGAGE LENDING

AcTlviTY 3 (1997).
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of mortgage law during which mortgagees have become increasingly removed
from the encumbered land.
B. The Decline ofthe Mortgagee'sRelationship to the Land
At the same time that the mortgage debt became increasingly more valuable

to lenders, the mortgage and the lender's fights in mortgaged land became
increasingly less valuable. This pendulum swing began during the late sixteenth
century when Chancery began to recharacterize mortgages and the rights they
granted to a lender. Rather than strictly enforce the forfeiture clause as the
courts of law did, equity now permitted a borrower to recover his property if he
repaid the debt within a reasonable time after its due date. This equitable right
was called the equity or right of redemption. 9' Originally, a borrower could take
advantage of this equitable right only if he could prove an equitable ground, such
as fraud, for his failure to repay the debt on its due date. 2 This equitable right
evolved so that by the early part of the seventeenth century, it applied to any
borrower who tendered payment of the debt within a reasonable time after its
due date regardless of the reason for failing to tender on the due date.93
Equity may have created the equity of redemption for two reasons. First,
equity abhors a forfeiture of title to land. Forfeiture pursuant to a gage was
particularly abhorrent because the land's value normally exceeded the
outstanding debt and because the debt was not reduced by the rents and profits
collected by the lender from the land. Such a forfeiture smacked of penalty.
Second, equity undoubtedly focused on the substance of the performance that
was due to the lender. The lender's primary right was repayment of the debt.
The precise time of payment was of only secondary importance. Therefore, if
the lender received payment within a reasonable time after the specified due
date, he should not be entitled to enforce such a potentially severe penalty
against the borrower.94
Despite its creation of the equity of redemption, Chancery at this time
continued to treat the gagee as the fee owner of the encumbered land.9
Parliament's repeal of the ban on charging interest, however, now provided an
important impetus for the further development of the equity of redemption. As
described above,96 once lenders could legally collect interest, they normally
allowed borrowers to retain possession of the land. As a result, Chancery
91. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at 158-59; Lloyd, supra note 12, at 235.
92. See OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 6, at 13.
93. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Dirlton, I Ch. Rep. 165 (1654); Emanuel College v.
Evans, 1 Ch. Rep. 18 (1625), cited in I GLENN, supra note 11, at 12-13.
94. One commentator attributes Chancery's break with the courts of law on this
issue to the struggle for power between the courts of law and of equity. See OSBORNE,
supra note 20, § 6, at 13; see also Lloyd, supra note 12, at 235.
95. See 1 GLENN, supra note 11, § 2, at 9-10.

96. See supranotes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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recharacterized the relationship of the borrower and lender during the life of the
loan. Chancery now held that the equity of redemption constituted not just a
right to pay a loan after its due date but an equitable estate in land. As such, the
borrower's estate could be transferred, mortgaged, divided into 97smaller estates,
subjected to dower and curtesy, and merged into the fee estate.
Although at this point in the mortgage's development the lender still was
treated as retaining an estate in the encumbered land, the rights attendant upon
the estate were substantially diminished. For example, in earlier times, a lender
who took possession of the borrower's land could keep the rents and profits from
the land with no obligation to apply them to reduce the debt or otherwise to
account to the borrower for them.98 Now, however, if the lender took possession
of the property, he was held to a strict duty of accounting to the borrower and
was under a legal duty to apply all amounts collected to the borrower's benefit."
In fact, Pollock says that, during this period in the mortgage's evolution, "the
plight of a mortgagee in possession is one of the most unenviable known to the
law."''0° This burdensome status made possession ofthe property during the life
of the loan far less attractive to lenders.
In addition to altering the lender's rights during the life of the loan, the
equity of redemption dramatically affected the lender's right to the land when the
loan relationship terminated. When Chancery began treating borrowers as
retaining an estate in the encumbered land, it did not provide a method by which
a lender could terminate that interest. Therefore, when a loan went into default,
only two methods existed to terminate the borrower's interest. The borrower
voluntarily could transfer his estate in the land to the lender, which the borrower
understandably might refuse to do if the land's value exceeded the debt amount.
Otherwise, a lender had to establish that the borrower had abandoned his interest
in the land. Because abandonment depends on proof of intent to abandon, this
remedy also was problematic, especially because of Chancery's solicitude for
borrowers. In fact, in one case, Chancery refused to find that a borrower had
abandoned his interest twenty years after the loan's due date."0 '

Because this situation threatened to destroy the utility of land as collateral
for loans, Chancery eventually created an equitable cause of action to eliminate
the borrower's interest in the land. Upon proof that a loan was in default,
Chancery would issue a decree that the borrower pay the loan within a specified
time. If the borrower failed to do so, the court entered a decree of foreclosure,
which eliminated the borrower's interest. The lender became the full fee owner
97. See 3 FRANCIS HARGRAVE & CHARLES BUTLER, NOTES ON LORD COKE'S FIRST
INSTITUTE ON COMMENTARY UPON LITrLETON § 332 n.96 (1809); OSBORNE, supra note

20, § 7, at 16-17.
98. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
99. See FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAND LAWS 134 (3d ed. 1896).
100. Id. (footnote omitted).
101. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at 158-59 n.29; 3 HARGRAVE & BUTLER,
supra note 97, § 337 n.106.
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of the land regardless of the land's value in relation to the outstanding debt
amount." 2 For this reason, this cause of action was called a "strict

foreclosure,"' 3 and it constituted the last significant vestige of the lender's
ownership interest in the encumbered land.
The harshness of strict foreclosure precipitated a further intervention by
Chancery to reflect the true nature of the loan relationship. As it had created the
right to redeem in response to the harshness of a borrower's forfeiture of title
when the loan was not paid on its due date, Chancery now created the right to
redeem from a strict foreclosure. As with the first redemption right, the new
redemption right could continue for years after the foreclosure and could be
exercised even if the lender had sold the land."°
Recognizing that keeping the land was again a problematic remedy, lenders
voluntarily completed the loan relationship's shift in focus from the land to the
debt. Lenders now began including in the loan documents a right to sell the
property in case of default and to retain only so much of the loan proceeds as
were needed to repay the debt. 5 If the sale price exceeded the debt, the owner
or any junior lienors were entitled to the surplus. This remedy quickly became
the most predominantly used,' 6 and by the early 1800s in England, the lender's
interest in the encumbered land firmly had shifted from fee title to a mere
security interest.10 7
The evolution of American mortgage law followed a similar, though
abbreviated, course. As in England, mortgages in colonial America were
worded as a conveyance of title to the lender, and some early American courts
characterized them as such.' However, the popular perception from the earliest
times was that a mortgage gave the lender only a security interest, and the
borrower routinely retained possession of the property."" One commentator
states that the borrower's retained possession was a reflection of hostility to the
creditor class.' A more likely explanation, however, is that the colonists were
acting in accordance with the understanding that was obvious to everyone but
lawyers-a mortgage is not intended to convey title to the lender but merely to
serve as security for the loan. Unencumbered by centuries of mortgage practice
in which lenders took possession of the mortgaged land, American mortgage law

102. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at 159; POLLOCK, supra note 99, at 13435.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

1 GLENN, supra note 11, § 59.1, at 401.
See 1GLENN, supra note 11, § 61, at 405.
See TURNER, supra note 29, at 121.
See TURNER, supra note 29, at 121-22.
See 3 HARGRAVE & BUTLER, supra note 99, § 332 n.96.
See Chaplin, supra note 16, at 12; Lloyd, supra note 12, at 240-41.
See Chaplin, supra note 16, at 12; Lloyd, supra note 12, at 240-41.
See Lloyd, supra note 12, at 240-41.
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evolved more quickly than English law to focus on the debt aspect of the
mortgage relationship."'
Despite this more rapid rate of change and despite the passage of more than
three hundred years, American mortgage law still has not completed its
transformation. Some states-the so-called title theory states-still characterize
a mortgage as conveying title and the immediate right to possess the mortgaged
land. Eight, or possibly as many as fourteen, states are title theory states."' The

111. Some early American courts and commentators did have difficulty developing
a legal basis for the borrower's retained possession and, as a result, characterized the
borrower as a tenant. See OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 13, at 23; POWELL, supra note 20,
at 205-06. Other courts and some early state legislatures, however, properly
characterized the lender's interest as a lien, rather than as an ownership interest.
South Carolina was the first state to enact legislation providing that a mortgage is
mere security for a debt and not a transfer of title. Act of 1791, 5 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 174
(1814). See also Navassa Guano Co. v. Richardson, 2 S.E. 307, 308-09 (S.C. 1887);
Verree v. Verree, 4 S.C.L. (2 Brev.) 211 (1807). Widespread recognition of the true
nature of a mortgage, however, is attributable to a line of New York Supreme Court
decisions from the early nineteenth century. See Lloyd, supra note 12, at 241; see also,
e.g., Bryan v. Butts, 27 Barb. 503 (N.Y. App. Div. 1857); Runyan v. Mersereau, 11
Johns. Ch. 534 (N.Y. Ch. 1814).
112. The title theory jurisdictions are:
Alabama: See ALA. CODE § 35-10-26 (1991);
Connecticut: See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-36h (West 1995); Olean v. Treglia,463 A.2d 242, 250 (Conn. 1983) ("Under the law of Connecticut, a mortgagee is deemed
to have taken legal title upon the execution of a mortgage on real property and therefore,
in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, has a right to immediate possession
against his mortgagor.");
District of Columbia: See D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-703 (1996);
Georgia: Although mortgages do not convey title in Georgia, see GA. CODE ANN.
§ 44-14-30 (1991), the normally used security instrument, the deed to secure debt, does
convey title. See GA. CODEANN. § 44-14-60 (1991);
Maine: See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 502 (West 1999);
New Hampshire: See Furbush v. Goodwin, 29 N.H. 321,332 (1854); see also State
v. Marion, 440 A.2d 448, 449 (N.H. 1982);

Rhode Island: See R.I. GEN. LAWs §34-11-20 (1995);
Tennessee: See Howell v. Tomlinson, 228 S.W.2d 112, 116 (Ten. Ct. App. 1949)
("The law of Tennessee has kept much of the common-law theory of mortgages .... [I]t
still adheres to the basic common-law notion that a mortgage vests the mortgagee with
the legal title to the land and the right to immediate possession."); see also In re
Maryville Say. & Loan Corp., 31 B.R. 597, 598 (E.D. Tenn. 1983), affid in part,rev'd
in part,743 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1984).
The law in six states is unclear as to whether the jurisdiction is a title theory state:
Arkansas: See In re Crime Free, Inc., 196 B.R. 116, 119 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1996)
("[T]he mortgagee, under Arkansas law, has title to the real property which passed when
the debtor gave the mortgage to the creditor. The contract between the parties
contemplated possession of the property by the debtor during the time the debtor agreed
to pay back its loan." (citation omitted) (emphasis added)); Bank of Oak Grove v.
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great majority of states, however, properly characterize a mortgage as being a
mere lien. These so-called lien theory states treat mortgages as transferring
neither title nor the right to possess but only the right to sell the property upon
default. A few states-the intermediate theory states-have not yet completed

the transition from title theory to lien theory. They treat mortgages as conveying

title but no right to possess until the borrower defaults."'
Even in the title theory states, state laws and practices increasingly have
shifted the focus of the mortgage relationship from the land to the debt. Statutes

in some title theory states significantly alter the rights that once characterized
title theory treatment of mortgages." 4 Judicial decisions in other title theory

Wilmot State Bank, 648 S.W.2d 802, 803 (Ark. 1983) ("[W]e are unwilling to decide the
issue on as broad and undefined a principle as lien versus title theories of mortgages.
Our cases do not support the argument that clearly.");
Maryland: Compare Darnestown Valley-WHM Ltd. Partnership v. McDonald's
Corp., 650 A.2d 1365, 1369 (Md. 1994) ("[T]here is usually incorporated into a
mortgage of a leasehold estate... a provision whereby the mortgagors, their personal
representatives and assigns, may continue to hold and possess the mortgaged premises.
...The effect of this agreement on the part of the mortgagee, which is known as a
redemise, is to make of the mortgagor, in most respects, a tenant to the mortgagee."), with
In re Bethesda Air Rights Ltd. Partnership, 117 B.R. 202, 208 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990)
("[T]he mortgagor is entitled to possession and the trappings of ownership until default,
subject to the rights of the mortgagee.").
Massachusetts: See Bank v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 915 F. Supp. 491,496
(1996) (describing Massachusetts as a title theory state but stating that "the mortgagee
may enter into possession of the mortgaged property upon default and before
foreclosure"); In re Tricca, 196 B.R. 214, 217 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) ("Massachusetts
is a title theory state with respect to mortgages. This means that the mortgagee holds
legal title to the real property and the mortgagor retains only the equity of redemption
accompanied by a right to possession.").
North Carolina: Compare Neil Realty Co. v. Medical Care, Inc., 431 S.E.2d 225,
226 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) ("North Carolina is considered a title theory state with respect
to mortgages, where a mortgagee does not receive a mere lien on mortgaged real
property, but receives legal title to the land for security purposes."), with Butner v.
United States, 440 U.S. 48, 52 n.3 (1979) ("[A] mortgagee is entitled to possession of the
mortgaged property on default .... ).
Pennsylvania: See In re Wynnewood House Assocs., 121 B.R. 716, 721 n.3
(Bankr. E.D. Penn. 1990) ("Pennsylvania is generally viewed as a 'title' state, as opposed
to a 'lien' state, concerning security interests in realty .... However, as is true in many
states, the title versus lien distinction has been blurred by court decisions.").
Virginia: CompareEastern Sav. Bank v. Epco Newport News Assocs., 14 B.R. 990
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (stating that Virginia is a title theory state), with In re Vienna
Park Props., 120 B.R. 332 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("[T]here is room to doubt the
conclusion inEpco that Virginia recognizes the title theory."), rev'd, 136 B.R. 43 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992).
113. See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW
§§ 4.1-4.3, at 127-35 (3d ed. 1994).
114. See id. § 4.1, at 129; 3 POWELL, supra note 62; Robert Kratovil, Mortgages
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states also have modified the common law treatment of mortgages." 5 Even
where the law has not been changed, mortgages routinely provide that the
borrower can retain possession until default or foreclosure." 6 Moreover, in
every title theory state, the lender must apply all collected rents and other income
from the property to reduce the debt.'"7 Thus, even the title theory states
recognize that the lender's paramount right is to repayment of the debt, with the
land and its rents and profits merely providing a source of repayment.
This conclusion is confirmed by the title theory states' treatment of the
lender's interest in the land. The interest clearly is treated as something other
than actual ownership of an estate in land. Title theory states do not assess real
property taxes against the mortgagee's interest. ' 18 The mortgagee's interest can

Problems in Possession, Rents, and Mortgagee Liability, 11 DEPAuL L. REV. 1, 5
(1961).
115. See, e.g., Red Rooster Constr. Co. v. River Assocs., Inc., 620 A.2d 118
(Conn. 1993). In Red Rooster,the court stated:
Despite our title theory of mortgages, "[i]n substance and effect... and
except for a very limited purpose, the mortgage is regarded as mere security
... and the mortgagor is for most purposes regarded as the sole owner of the
land .... " The mortgagee "has title and ownership enough to make his
security available, but for substantially all other purposes he is not regarded
as owner, but the mortgagor is so regarded, always subject of course to the
mortgage."
Id. at 122 (citations omitted); Turner Adver. Co. v. Garcia, 311 S.E.2d 466, 468 (Ga.)
(stating security deed conveys title but only a limited right to possess), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 824 (1984); In re Maryville Say. & Loan Corp., 31 B.R. 597 (E.D. Tenn. 1983),
aff'd in part,rev'd in part,743 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1984). In Maryville Savings, the court
stated:
In Tennessee, execution and delivery of a deed of trust or mortgage on real
property passes legal title to the land to the trustee or mortgagee. Tennessee
is therefore known as a "title theory" state. Tennessee courts, however, are not
strict in their application of the "title theory." The doctrine is applied only
when necessary to protect the mortgagee's security afforded by the estate.
Id. at 598 (citations omitted).
116. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 113, § 4.1, at 129; Kratovil, supra note
114, at 5-6; see also Williams v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 175 A. 331, 333 (Md. 1934).
117. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 502 (West 1999); In re 5028 Wisconsin
Ave. Assocs., Ltd., 167 B.R. 699, 705 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1994); Nettles v. First Nat'l Bank,
388 So. 2d 916, 920 (Ala. 1980); Karnes v. Marrow, 864 S.W.2d 848, 850 (Ark. 1933);
Milici v. Ferarra, 48 A.2d 562, 564 (Conn. 1946); Williams Realty & Loan Co. v.
Simmons, 3 S.E.2d 580, 583 (Ga. 1939); Hubbard v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 192 A.
592, 594 (Md. 1937); Barrows v. Boles, 687 A.2d 979, 988 (N.H. 1996); Koury v. Sood,
62 A.2d 649, 652-53 (R.I. 1948); Schmid v. Baum's Home of Flowers, 37 S.W.2d 105,
110 (Tenn. 1931); Kratovil, supra note 114, at 7.
118. See ALA. CODE § 40-5-12 (1991) (listing property that is subject to taxation;
mortgagee's interest not included); Hood v. Clark, 37 So. 550 (Ala. 1904); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 26-26-709(a) (Michie 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-64(a) (West 1995)
-
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be transferred or extinguished by an assignment or release, rather than by a deed
or other formal conveyance." 9 Neither dower nor curtesy, when recognized,
attached to the mortgagee's interest. 2 '
The virtual abolition of strict foreclosure in this country also is strong proof
that a mortgage does not convey an estate in land even in title theory
jurisdictions. For strict foreclosure to operate, the foreclosing lender already
must have title to the land. Strict foreclosure does not vest new rights in the
lender; it simply eliminates the borrower's rights.' 2 ' All but three states have
eliminated strict foreclosure except in the most limited circumstances. 22 States
have rejected strict foreclosure not because lenders were seeking a more efficient
method of foreclosure, as they had in England. Instead, state legislatures have
abolished strict foreclosure because the lender's right is only to repayment of the

(listing property that is subject to taxation; mortgagee's interest is not included);
Lockwood v. Blodgett, 138 A. 520 (Conn. 1927); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 47-813, -822
(1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-5-9 (1991) (requiring possession); Decatur County Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n v. Thigpen, 160 S.E. 387 (Ga. 1931); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 551
(West 1999) (listing property subject to taxation but excluding mortgages); Williams v.
Hilton, 35 Me. 547 (1853); MD. CODE ANN. TAX-PROP. §§ 6-101 to -104 (1994) (listing
property that is subject to taxation; referring to interest of mortgagor or grantor under a
deed of trust as taxable); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 73:10 (1991) (taxing property to
person claiming or in possession); LI. GEN. LAws § 44-4-5 (1995) ("The mortgagor
shall be deemed to be the owner of mortgaged real estate, so long as the same is in the
mortgagor's possession."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-5-501 (1994).
119. See ALA. CODE § 35-10-27 (1991); Turner v. Flinn, 72 Ala. 532 (1882); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 18-40-109. (Michie 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-9, -10 (West
1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-3 (1991); Frost v. Gazaway, 176 S.E.2d 476 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1970); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 551 (West 1999); Allard v. Lane, 18 Me. 9
(1840); MD. CODE, REAL PROP. § 3-105 (1994); Baker v. Otto, 22 A.2d 924, 926 (Md.
1941); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 479:7 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-26-3 (1995); Polston

v. Scandlyn, 108 S.W.2d 1104, 1107, 1109 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937).
120. See, e.g., Barton v. Lumpkin, 171 So. 2d 101, 103 (Ala. 1965); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 28-11-303(c) (Michie 1987); Fish v. Fish, 1 Conn. 559 (1816); D.C. CODEANN.
§ 19-102(b) (1996); LaGrange Mills v. Kener, 49 S.E. 300, 303 (Ga. 1904); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 6, ch. 65, § 32 (1884) (providing that a mortgagee's interest is not subject
to dower or curtesy), repealed,ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §2-133 (1964)); Knox v.
Stamper, 46 A.2d 361, 365-66 (Md. 1946); Stanton v. Boatright, 302 S.W.2d 347, 349
(Tenn. 1957).

121. See OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 312, at 653.
122. Several states permit strict foreclosure in very limited circumstances, such as
when ajunior lienor was omitted from ajudicial foreclosure sale and the mortgaged land
was worth less than the outstanding amount of the debt being foreclosed. See NELSON
& WHITMAN, supra note 113, §7.10, at 487-90. Three states permit strict foreclosure in
less narrowly defined situations: (1) Connecticut: See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 4915, -16, -19, -20, -24 (West 1995); (2) Vermont: See VT. R. CIv. P. 80.1 (1988); and (3)
Illinois: See Great Lakes Mortgage Corp. v. Collymore, 302 N.E.2d 248, 250 (II1. App.
Ct. 1973).
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debt and not to the land. Foreclosure by sale has been the predominant
foreclosure method in America since the beginning of the nineteenth century.

Even when a lender can take possession of the mortgaged property, such as
with the borrower's consent or pursuant to an assignment of rents, substantial
disincentives exist for doing so. A mortgagee in possession is subject to "harsh"
rules of accounting.' 23 Pursuant to these accounting rules, a mortgagee is
required to account not only for any money actually collected from the property,
but also for any revenue that could have been generated if the mortgagee had
managed the property like a "provident owner." 24 The borrower's debt must be
reduced by all such revenues in excess of the lender's expenses in operating the
property.
A mortgagee in possession also is subject to substantial potential
management liabilities. First, the mortgagee can be liable for injuries sustained
on the property and for nuisances existing on the property even if the defective
condition already existed when the mortgagee went into possession of the
land."2 Second, if the mortgagee is unable to lease the land, authority exists that
the mortgagee actually must work the land, such as by farming it, and must
account to the borrower for the generated income. 26 If the mortgagee fails to do
so, it still must account to the borrower for the land's fair rental value.' 27 Third,
the mortgagee is obligated to maintain the property and will be liable for
damages caused by its failure to act. 28 Finally, the mortgagee may be liable for
violating any covenants that run with the land. 129 These sources of management
liability are particularly troublesome for the usual lenders because their land
possession and management functions generally have so far atrophied from those
not to take
of their earlier counterparts. Therefore, mortgagees generally 3prefer
0
possession of the encumbered land even if they could do so.
The practical and legal burdens now imposed on a mortgagee in possession,
coupled with the changes in mortgage law and practice that substantially have
limited the circumstances under which the mortgagee even has the option to take
possession, have substantially contributed to the shift in emphasis from the land
to the debt in mortgage transactions. This shift in emphasis also has been caused

in large part by the dramatic transformation of the national and international
capital markets. American lenders traditionally made loans based on the security
of land located within fifty miles of their office. 31 In part, this was due to legal
123. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 113, § 4.27, at 185.
124. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 113, § 4.27, at 186, 188.
125. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supranote 113, § 4.26, at 183-84; Kratovil, supra
note 114, at 23-24.

126. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 113, § 4.28, at 188.
127. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 113, § 4.28, at 187-88.
128. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 113, § 4.29, at 189-90.
129. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 113, § 4.26, at 184-85.
130. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 113, § 4.33, at 195.

131. "In the 'good old days,' savings institutions didn't buy and sell loans. They
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limitations on lenders' powers. 3 2 But it also reflected the essentially personal
character of the relationship between the borrower and lender.
That personal relationship has been shattered by the explosive growth of the
secondary mortgage market during the past twenty-five years. Purchasers in the
secondary mortgage market buy mortgage loans from the lenders that originated
them. The market has caused mortgage holders to become increasingly removed
from the mortgaged land. In fact, most purchasers in the secondary market have
never seen the land on which they hold mortgages. The borrower's
creditworthiness and the property's stream of income have become far more
important to mortgage holders than the land. The result is that mortgages
increasingly are viewed as investment devices administered by corporations,
rather than as a personal relationship between a borrower and lender. 3 ' "The

secondary market is like a great food processor. What goes in comes out
unrecognizable to borrowers and lenders, but looks appetizing to investors. The
raw material in the process, the mortgage itself, now is incidental to the
134
process."'
A secondary market for mortgages is not a new development. Mortgages
have always been transferable, and a market for mortgages existed in England
as early as the thirteenth century. 35 In this country, a market for mortgages has
existed for the past century. 36 The market in America was relatively quiet,
however, until the 1930s, when Congress acted to overcome the Great
Depression's devastating effects on the housing market. Foreclosures reached
record numbers, and hundreds of thousands of people were homeless. 37
Investors lost confidence in mortgage lending, which substantially contributed
38
to a decrease in available capital and the constriction of the housing market.
In response, Congress created the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) in
1934. The FHA was authorized to insure home mortgage loans, thereby
protecting lenders from borrower defaults. This protection enabled lenders to
require smaller down payments and to extend the terms of loans, which enabled

made conventional loans within 50 miles of their home offices and kept them in portfolio
until they were paid off." Secondary MortgageMarket, SAVINGS INSTS., Jan. 1988, at
S-11.
132. See Joseph Philip Forte, From Main Street to Wall Street: Commercial
Mortgage-BackedSecurities, PROB. & PROP., Jan./Feb. 1996, at 8.
133. See 3 POWELL, supra note 62, at 37-38.
134. TUCHMAN, LATEST INNOVATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES MORTGAGE MARKET

126 (1990).
135. See Jo Anne Bradner, The SecondaryMortgageMarket and State Regulation
ofReal Estate Financing,36 EMORY L.J. 971, 974 (1987).

136. See Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization:Evolution,
CurrentIssues and New Frontiers,69 TEX. L. REv. 1369, 1380 (1991).
137. See Bradner, supra note 135, at 975.
138. See Robin Paul Malloy, The Secondary MortgageMarket - A Catalystfor
Change in Real Estate Transactions,39 SW. L.J. 991, 992 (1986).
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more prospective borrowers to qualify for home loans. Government insurance
also helped restore investor confidence in the mortgage market, thereby
increasing available capital.
To provide further support to the housing market, Congress created the
Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) in 1938. FNMA, which is now
named Fannie Mae, was the first government agency created for the purpose of
participating in the secondary mortgage market. 39 Fannie Mae's initial charge
was to buy FHA-insured loans. When Fannie Mae purchased a loan, the
originator had a renewed source of capital for lending and was freed from the
risk of default on the loan. Moreover, through its purchases, Fannie Mae was
able to funnel funds from regions of the country that had a capital surplus to
regions that had insufficient capital for home lending. Because of this program's
success in stimulating the housing market, Congress extended Fannie Mae's
purchasing authority in the 1940s to Veterans Administration (VA) guaranteed
loans.
Despite Fannie Mae's success, the secondary market remained relatively
small until the 1970s. 40 Before 1970, Fannie Mae had been restricted to buying
FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed loans.' 4' Spurred by a concern that housing
demand would exceed the supply of mortgage capital, Congress expanded the
government's role in the secondary market. In 1968, it divided Fannie Mae into
two parts: (1)the entity currently known as Fannie Mae and (2) the Government
National Mortgage Association (GNMA), which is now named Ginnie Mae.
The new Fannie Mae is a federally chartered institution but is owned by private
shareholders. It could now purchase conventional mortgages (mortgages that are
not insured or guaranteed by a federal agency), as well as FHA and VA
mortgages. Additionally, Congress authorized Fannie Mae to issue securities
backed by pools of its mortgages ("mortgage-backed securities"). Unlike Fannie
Mae, Ginnie Mae is a government corporation within the Department of Housing
and Urban Development. Ginnie Mae was created to handle special government
assistance and housing support programs and to guarantee securities backed by
FHA and VA loans. 42

Despite Fannie Mae's new authority to purchase conventional loans, they
were not as readily saleable on the secondary market as FHA and VA loans.
With the real estate boom in the late 1960s, mortgage capital was not always
available in sufficient quantities in boom areas. Therefore, Congress enacted the
Emergency Home Finance Act in 1970. The Act created a third governmentsponsored institution in the secondary mortgage market-the Federal Home

139. See id. at 992-93; Shenker & Colletta, supra note 136, at 1383-84.
140. See THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET: A HANDBOOK OF STRATEGIES,
TECHNIQUES, AND CRITICAL ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY MORTGAGE FINANCE 74 (Jess

Lenderman ed., 1987) [hereinafter SECONDARY MORTGAGE HANDBOOK].

141. See Bradner, supra note 135, at 976-77.
142. See Bradner, supra note 135, at 977.
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Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC). FHLMC, which is now named Freddie
Mac, specialized in buying conventional home mortgages.' 43

Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae have been responsible for
radical changes in mortgage lending relationships. To finance their secondary
market activities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have issued stock, bonds, and
notes.'" But of far greater importance are Fannie Mae's, Freddie Mac's, and
Ginnie Mae's sale of mortgage securities. Rather than sell whole mortgages to
individual investors, as had formerly been the practice, all three entities began
creating pools of mortgages and selling either fractional ownership interests in
the mortgages (participation certificates) or bonds secured by a pool of
mortgages (mortgage-backed bonds). In the former, ownership of the mortgages
is transferred to investors. In the latter, the investor acquires only a security
collateralized by the pool of mortgages. 4
These mortgage securities have been immensely successful in drawing
capital into the residential mortgage market. Within twenty years of their birth
in 1970, mortgage-backed securities outgrew the combined markets for corporate
bonds and municipal bonds.1 46 By the mid-1990s, more than three-quarters of
the new single family residential mortgages were being securitized1 47 Based on
its sale of mortgage securities, Fannie Mae has become the largest corporation
in the United States with assets exceeding $351 billion. 48 Its assets are $15
billion greater than those of Chase Manhattan, the largest U.S. bank. Fannie
Mae has $80 billion more
in assets than General Electric and ranks 29th on the
49
1997 Fortune 500 list.

The sale ofmortgage securities has enabled Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and
Ginnie Mae to become extremely important in residential mortgage lending. At
the end of 1996, Fannie Mae had total mortgages outstanding worth more than
$830 billion, which is more than one-fifth of the $4 trillion U.S. residential
mortgage market.150 Together, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchased 44% of
the conventional conforming single-family mortgages 5 ' originated in 1996, and

143. See Bradner, supranote 135, at 978.
144. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 113, § 11.3, at 790.
145. See Bradner, supra note 135, at 983. For ease of reference, the term
"mortgage securities" will be used to refer to mortgage-backed securities and
participation certificates.
146. See Henry A. Fernandez, GlobalizationofMortgage-BackedSecurities, 1987
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 357,357.

147. See Forte, supra note 132, at 12.
148. See FANNIE MAE, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 66. In a July 1997 letter, Fannie
Mae announced that its assets had increased to $366 billion. Id.
149. See Richard W. Stevenson, The Velvet FistofFannieMae, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.

20, 1997, at F9.
150. See FANNIE MAE, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 2.
151. "Conventional" mortgages are mortgages that are not insured or guaranteed
by a federal agency. "Conforming" mortgages are mortgages securing an original
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41% and 53% of the loans originated in 1995 and 1994, respectively. 5 2 In the
first quarter of 1998, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac issued $103.53 billion in new
mortgage-backed securities.' 53 In 1995, Ginnie Mae financed 800,000 residential

mortgages, and its mortgage-backed securities program guaranteed securities
totaling $64 billion. Its total mortgage-backed securities outstanding were
54
valued at $464 billion.1
This tremendous market presence in the residential mortgage market has
profoundly altered the formerly personal nature of the mortgage lending
relationship. This change has been further fueled by private entities' sale of
mortgage-backed securities. In 1977, Bank of America was the first private
entity to sell mortgage-backed securities.'55 Despite the success of this issuance,
the growth of the private mortgage-backed securities market did not initially
enjoy the same explosive growth as the market for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
and Ginnie Mae securities because these government-related
entities were free
56
of several regulatory constraints binding private issuers.
To encourage the private sector's involvement in raising capital for
residential mortgage lending, Congress enacted the Secondary Mortgage Market
Enhancement Act of 1984 (SMMEA). 5 7 The Act eliminates many of the legal
obstacles to private issuances, although it does not provide the full faith and
credit of the United States. Despite this remaining competitive disadvantage, the
private mortgage securities market rapidly expanded after SMMEA's
enactment. Within four years, private offerings increased seven-fold to more
than $71 billion; more than one-third of all private offerings were mortgagebacked securities. 58
The mortgage securities market had another substantial growth spurt in the
1980s when it expanded into commercial mortgage lending. The commercial
principal amount that is less than a statutorily-specified limit. "Single-family" includes
one-to-four family homes. FREDDIE MAC, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 16.
152. See FREDDIE MAC, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 16.
153. See Fannie,Freddie Report Record Earningsin Boom MortgageMarket of
Early '98, INSIDE MORTGAGE FIN., Apr. 24, 1998, at 9.
154. See GOVERNMENT NAT'L MORTGAGE Assoc., 1995

ANNUAL REPORT 1.

155. See Bradner, supra note 135, at 979.
156. For example, unlike the private issuers at this time, the government-related
issuers did not have to register their offerings under the securities laws and were not
bound by state legal investment laws and blue sky laws. Moreover, Ginnie Mae
securities are less risky than private securities because Ginnie Mae's securities are backed
by the full faith and credit of the United States. Although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

are not similarly backed, investors commonly assume that the federal government would

stand behind securities issued by them. See Bradner, supra note 135, at 980; Shenker &
Colletta, supra note 136, at 1385-86.
157. Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat. 1689 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
158. See Edward L. Pittman, Economic and Regulatory Developments Affecting
MortgageRelated Securities, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 497, 497 (1989).

MISSOURILA WREVIEW

[Vol. 64

market had remained largely unsecuritized during the rapid expansion of the
residential market for two primary reasons. First, commercial properties and
loans are less uniform than residential properties and loans. As a result, the
commercial real estate lending market historically has not had uniform
underwriting standards or loan documentation, both of which are essential to
investor evaluation of the mortgages in a securitized pool. Second, the federal
government traditionally has not been as concerned with the commercial real
estate market as it has been with the housing market. Therefore, the federal
government did not provide the same supports to the commercial market that it
provided to the residential market, such as buying, insuring, guaranteeing, and
pooling mortgages. 59
The commercial mortgage market greatly expanded, however, in the 1980s.
At that time, credit rating agencies began evaluating and rating commercial
mortgages as they had been doing for residential mortgages for a decade. With
ratings available for commercial mortgage securities, they became far more
saleable. Even investors without any knowledge about the real estate and
mortgage markets now could evaluate the relative benefits of investing in
commercial mortgage securities in comparison to other types of investments.1 60
The commercial mortgage securities market was further accelerated when the
federal government began issuing commercial mortgage securities. In 1989,
Congress created Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) to handle the assets of
failed thrift institutions.161 In that process, RTC had to dispose of an immense
number of mortgages. Because disposing of them individually would have been
extremely difficult and time-consuming, RTC pooled them and issued mortgagebacked securities. In 1992 alone, it issued $9.1 billion in these securities.
The methods RTC created to securitize these mortgages have provided a
more uniform national structure for the secondary market to securitize
commercial mortgages. 62 Although commercial mortgage-backed securities
were issued for less than five and one-half percent of the total outstanding
commercial mortgage debt in 1994,63 many people speculate that securitization
may substantially displace traditional commercial mortgage lending practices as
it has in the residential mortgage lending market."6 If that prediction is correct,
the total value of mortgage-backed securities in this country will increase

159. See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 136, at 1398-99.
160. See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 136, at 1401-02.
161. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcements Act of 1989, Pub.
L. No. 101-73, § 501, 103 Stat. 183, 184 (1989) (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
162. See Laurence G. Preble, The RecapitalizationofReal Estate,PROB. & PROP.,

Mar./Apr. 1994, at 45, 48-49.
163. See Forte, supra note 132, at 13.
164. See Peter F. Culver, The Dawning of Securitization, PROB. & PROP.,
Mar./Apr. 1994, at 34, 34.
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dramatically; commercial properties in the United States have an estimated
aggregate value of a few trillion dollars.'65
The rapidly growing secondary mortgage market is not the only real estate
finance vehicle that is displacing the traditionally personal relationship between
borrowers and lenders. The real estate investment trust (REIT), which has been
enjoying a resurgence of popularity in the 1990s, is having the same effect." A
REIT is a corporation or trust that pools investors' funds to make mortgage loans
("mortgage REITs") or to buy real estate ("equity REITs").' 67 Their popularity
holdings; American
with investors is demonstrated by the immense size of their
1 68
REITs currently have more than $116.6 billion in assets.
In fact, Congress authorized the creation of REITs as a means to encourage
investors to invest in real estate in the same way that they invest in stock and
bond mutual funds.' 69 REIT shares are traded on national and regional stock
exchanges, including the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock
Exchange, and NASDAQ. REIT shares provide investors with greater liquidity
and diversity than is possible with more traditional forms of real estate
investment. 7 But REIT investors, like mortgage securities investors, are far
removed from the land in which they acquire an interest. Most REIT investors
never even see the land; they simply buy shares at a stock exchange.
Investors' unfamiliarity with the lands in which they own interests is most
clearly illustrated by the popularity of American mortgage securities and REITs
with foreign investors.' 7 ' Billions of dollars of these securities are listed on
foreign stock exchanges and have been sold throughout the world.' The rapidly
increasing foreign appetite for American real estate securities has been
responsible for the galloping growth of American investment bankers' overseas
165. See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 136, at 1397.
166. REITs had been widely used in the early 1970s, but the REIT market crashed
in the mid-1970s in what has been called the "REIT debacle." See James de Bree,
UnleveragedBuyouts: Using REITs to Securitize Real Estate, REAL EST. FIN. J., Fall
1993, at 31, 31.
167. Larry Witner, REITs: The Revolution in Real Estate Financing,22 REAL EST.
L.J. 248, 249 (1994).
168. See NAREIT Online, Doc. #20 <http://www.nareit.com/taxondemI/201.html>.
169. See Preble, supra note 162, at 45.
170. See Preble, supra note 162, at 46; cf. Edward I. Biskind, "Old-Fashioned"
Real EstateInvestment: A Viable Choicefor the 1990's, REAL EST. FIN. J., Winter 1997,
at 65.
171. American mortgage securities and REITs are attractive to foreign investors
for several reasons. One of the primary reasons is to avoid the tax on capital gains
imposed by the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act. See Witner, supra note
167, at 251; see also de Bree, supra note 166, at 32.
172. See David Alan Richards, "Gradableand Tradable:" The Securitizationof
Commercial Real Estate Mortgages, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 99, 110 (1987); see also
TUCHMAN, supranote 134, at 21,40,42; Malloy, supra note 138, at 1014 n.155; Shenker
& Colletta, supra note 136, at 1422-26.
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offices. For example, Morgan Stanley's London office increased from 80 to 750
people in four years, and its Tokyo office grew from 15 to 350 people in that
same time. 73 Presumably, the international investors in American real estate
securities have never seen, much less inspected, the lands underlying them.
In fact, a key attraction of mortgage securities is that investors do not have
to conduct the types of property evaluations necessary for more direct forms of
real estate investment. 174 The phenomenal growth in the secondary market is
largely attributable to its success in attracting investment by the huge pool of
investors who formerly avoided investing in real estate because of a lack of real
estate expertise. 75 Mortgage securities are touted as an investment that does not
require the time consuming and tedious task of evaluating hundreds or thousands
of loan files. Like foreign investors, American investors rarely examine an
appraisal or title report, much less inspect the property itself. 76 Indeed, property
inspections would be daunting for even the most energetic investor. To diversify
risk and to maintain liquidity, mortgage pools are geographically diverse. For
example, one credit rating agency's ratings require that no more than ten percent
of the properties
in the mortgage pool be from any one standard metropolitan
177
statistical area.

Rather than relying on personal evaluations, mortgage securities investors
normally rely on credit ratings. 17 As described above, the commercial mortgage
securities market did not become firmly established until credit ratings became
available. 79 But even the rating agencies do not significantly focus on the
mortgaged land in assessing the risk of mortgage securities. Although mortgage
investors traditionally had been primarily concerned with the quality of the
mortgaged land, the land has a relatively insignificant effect on today's ratings.
Instead, the ratings are based on the mortgage pool's projected cash flow. 80 The
physical condition of the mortgaged properties is a factor considered in an
analysis of a mortgage pool, but it is only one factor of many. Virtually every
other factor focuses on the loans.'' Rating agencies normally do not even

173. See Fernandez, supranote 146, at 362.
174. See 3 POWELL, supranote 62, at 37-43; SECONDARY MORTGAGE HANDBOOK,
supra note 140, at 74; Bradner, supra note 135, at 990; Secondary Mortgage Market,
supra note 131, at S-14.
175. See Bradner, supranote 135, at 990.
176. See 3 POWELL, supra note 62, at 37-43; Richards, supra note 172, at 119.
177. See Bradner, supra note 135, at 991 n.92.

178. See Forte, supra note 132, at 12.
179. See Richards, supra note 172, at 113; Shenker & Colletta, supra note 136, at
1401.
180. See Richards, supra note 172, at 115; Shenker & Colletta, supranote 136, at
1401.
181. See Forte, supra note 132, at 12; Norman Weinberg, The Changing Wisdom
RegardingReal Estate Investment Strategy, REAL EST. REV., Winter 1997, at 3.
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inspect the land, but instead simply rely on photographs.'
For residential
mortgages, agencies usually do not even look at photographs.
This focus on cash flow reflects the school of thought that a loan should not
be made if the land is necessary to justify the extension of credit.'83 But the
pressure to produce loans has caused originators to make loans with less
documentation than traditionally has been required for mortgage loans." This
lack of attention to the land and to its value became so pronounced and
widespread that, as part of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989, Congress enacted legislation to regulate appraisers
and the appraisal process in an effort to make appraisals more accurate. 8 The

House Committee on Government Operations reported that incorrect appraisals
had become a "serious national problem" that "seriously damaged" and
"contributed directly to the insolvency of hundreds" of financial institutions.'86
The immense dimensions that this problem assumed before being recognized
again demonstrates the mortgage securities market's general indifference to the
mortgaged land.
The rapid and pervasive automation of lending activities and of the
mortgage securities market has significantly contributed to a focus on the
quantitative aspects of the securities offering, rather than on its qualitative
features, such as the condition of the mortgaged land. Lenders now originate
out-of-state loans by means of computerized loan origination networks.8 7
Technology also has facilitated the rapid sale of loans from their originators to
the secondary market. 88 When Freddie Mac first computerized its purchasing
activities in the early 1980s, an investment banker transferred 1,070 loans to
Freddie Mac in twelve minutes via Freddie Mac's computer. 8 9 Fannie Mae
estimates that, by the year 2000, eighty percent of its loan purchases will be by
182. See Richards, supra note 172, at 119.
183. See Joanne Robbins Hicken, Real Estate Appraisers and Appraisals:
ChangesMandated by FIRREA, 20 REAL EST. L.J. 157, 178-79 (1991).
184. See TUCHMAN, supra note 134, at 39; Pittman, supra note 158, at 546;

185. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3331-3352 (1994). Section 3331 provides:
The purpose of this chapter is to provide that Federal financial and public

policy interests in real estate related transactions will be protected by
requiring that real estate appraisals utilized in connection with federally
related transactions are performed in writing, in accordance with uniform
standards, by individuals whose competency has been demonstrated and
whose professional conduct will be subject to effective supervision.
12 U.S.C. § 3331 (1994).
186. HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, IMPACT OF APPRAISAL PROBLEMS ON
REAL ESTATE LENDING, MORTGAGE INSURANCE, AND INVESTMENT INTHE SECONDARY
MARKET, H.R. REP. No. 99-891, at 8 (1986).
187. See Richards, supra note 172, at 110.
188. See Malloy, supra note 138, at 994 n.23; Pittman, supra note 158, at 541;
Richards, supra note 172, at 110.
189. See TUCHMAN, supra note 134, at 39.
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computer.' 9 Technology also has been created to facilitate mortgage securities
trading by providing rapid access to sophisticated information about securities,
analysis of investment opportunities, and stewardship of holdings.
Such rapid and massive selling of mortgages and mortgage securities
requires uniformity. Standardization of mortgage loans enables purchasers to
invest in mortgages without separately analyzing each mortgage in the pool.
Mortgages become more, liquid investments, and transaction costs are
diminished. As a result, the mortgage market operates more efficiently.' 91
Although borrowers benefit from the resulting enhancement in the flow of
capital nationally and intemationally, the market demand for standardization has
triggered a ripple effect, each ring of which increasingly has caused a decline in
the individualized treatment of borrowers. The first wave of homogenization
was the standardization of loan documentation. In 1970, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac promulgated standard residential loan forms. 92 The documents
became so widely used that, by 1984, the then Vice Chair of the Federal Reserve
Bank said: "We have now reached a point where conventional mortgage
documents are standardized nationally."' 93 Commercial loan documentation
currently 94is undergoing a similar, albeit less rapid and thorough, standardization
process.'
The next wave of homogenization moved beyond the terms of the loan and
has affected the work to be performed with the loan proceeds. Developers now
are counseled to plan the funded building project in accordance with secondary
mortgage market construction standards. "Increasingly, [borrowers and lenders]
must refer to the objectives and business standards of unknown investors as
benchmarks for the conduct of what superficially appears to be a local real estate
195
transaction."'
The next outward ripple has affected industries related to mortgage lending.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac now investigate private mortgage insurers and
maintain an approved list of insurers.'96 To decrease the transaction costs that
would be incurred to separately examine the insurance for each mortgage in the
pool purchased or securitized, mortgage insurance also has become increasingly
standardized. 97
The final ripple of standardization has the potential to cause the most
dramatic change to the mortgage relationship. Despite the states' jealous control
of the laws affecting land within their borders, the market pressure for
190. See FANNIE MAE, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 5.
191.
192.
193.
See also 3
194.
195.
196.
197.

See Bradner, supra note 135, at 991-92; Malloy, supra note 138, at 1014-15.
See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 113, §3.36, at 789.
H.R. REP. No. 98-994 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2827, 2846.
POWELL, supra note 62, at 37-44.
See Forte, supra note 132, at 14.
Malloy, supra note 138, at 1017.
See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 113, §11.3, at 789.
See Bradner, supra note 135, at 991 n.93.
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federalization of mortgage law, particularly with respect to foreclosures, is
increasing. With the expanding importance of the secondary market, mortgage
loans are more widely being viewed as a matter of national, rather than strictly
local, importance.' The secondary market wants standardized mortgage laws

for the same reasons it wants standardized loan documents, construction
standards, and mortgage-related services-to decrease transaction costs, increase

efficiency, and facilitate the secondary mortgage market.
The differences among states' foreclosure laws are particularly troublesome
to the secondary market because of the impact these laws can have on the
amount and timing of the income stream from the mortgage pool. 99 A state's
foreclosure methods and foreclosure-related borrower protection laws can
substantially affect the collectability of a defaulted loan. For example, the
Minnesota statutory redemption statute permits a borrower to retain possession
of property for up to a year after it has been sold at a foreclosure sale.2° In
California, a lender may be prohibited by an antideficiency statute from suing a
borrower for repayment of the debt after a foreclosure sale even if the mortgaged
land has dropped in value to less than the debt amount.20' These Minnesota and
California laws are not anomalies. Many states have similar statutes.2 2
Moreover, states vary greatly in the amount of time and money needed to
complete a foreclosure sale. 0 3
The differences among the states are so pronounced that they can have a
significant impact on the value of mortgage securities. For this reason,
prospectuses for mortgage securities offerings usually include a description of
the mortgage laws for the states in which the pooled mortgages originated. 20,
The relevant state laws also significantly affect credit rating agencies'
evaluations of mortgage securities.0 5 Presumably, mortgage securities with
lower ratings will be less attractive to investors and may impede the flow of
mortgage capital to those states with more pro-borrower foreclosure laws.
To prevent this disruption in the flow of capital, some commentators have
called for Congress to intervene and preempt state foreclosure laws with a
uniform national procedure. 206 At first, federal preemption of this magnitude
may seem unthinkable. The great variations among states' foreclosure laws
reflects decades of evolution in the borrower-lender relationship based on the
unique experiences of each state. However, the federal government has

198. See Bradner, supra note 135, at 971, 991; Malloy, supranote 138, at 1018.
199. See Bradner, supra note 135, at 994-95, 1000.
200. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 580.23 (West 1988).
201. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. §§ 580b, 580d (West 1999).

202. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 113, §§ 8.3, 8.4.

203. See Bradner, supra note 135, at 997-98.
204. See Bradner, supra note 135, at 995.
205. See Bradner, supra note 135, at 994-95, 1000-01.
206. See Bradner, supra note 135, at 1001, 1003.
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demonstrated its willingness to preempt state mortgage lending laws in three
ways.
First, Congress already has enacted laws preempting state foreclosure laws
for loans held by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
Congress enacted the Single Family Mortgage Foreclosure Act in 19942'0 and the
Multi-Family Mortgage Foreclosure Act in 1981208 for HUD-held loans. Each
Act exempts HUD from state foreclosure laws. During the past two years,
Congress has come very close to enacting a federal foreclosure bill that would
have preempted state foreclosure laws for all mortgages held by any federal
agency. 2°9 Although the bill was not enacted, knowledgeable observers are
predicting that it will be introduced in Congress again. 210 As Congress attempts
to balance the federal budget, the significant cost savings resulting from an
elimination of borrower protection statutes and from a speedier foreclosure
process make preemption of state law particularly attractive.
Second, even without express congressional preemption, a variety of federal
agencies rely on the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution to justify their
refusal to comply with state mortgage laws. When an agency acts as a
mortgagee, its actions are governed by federal law. The issue that arises in this
context is whether the agency should adopt state law as the federal rule or craft
a new federal rule to be applied nationally. 21' Even in the absence of an express
preemptive federal regulation, agencies often refuse to adopt state law as the
federal rule. Federal agencies have been particularly hostile to state mortgagor
protection laws, such as statutory redemption rights and antideficiency
legislation.212
The outcomes in cases concerning the agencies' obligation to observe state
mortgage law have been mixed,21 3 particularly because the United States
Supreme Court's most important decision on this issue, United States v. Kimbell
Foods, 214 sets out a three-part test that provides little concrete guidance. In
determining whether a federal agency should observe state law as the federal
rule, the Court said that three factors must be considered: (1) whether the federal
program, by its nature, requires uniform national rules; (2) whether application
of state law would frustrate the federal program's objectives; and (3) the extent
to which application of a federal rule would disrupt commercial -relationships

207. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3751-3768 (1994).
208. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3717 (1994).
209. The bill originally was included in H.R. 2234, which was designated the Debt
Collection Improvement Act of 1995. It since has been included in a variety of other
bills. See Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., The New FederalForeclosureLaws, 49 OKLA. L.
REV. 123, 123 (1996).
210. See id.
211. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 718 (1979).
212. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supranote 113, §11.6, at 843.
213. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 113, §11.6, at 845-46.
214. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
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that were based on state law.2'5 The frequency with which federal agencies
refuse to observe state law since the Kimbell Foods decision indicates the
agencies' belief that state regulation of mortgage transactions is less important
than a more efficient federal mortgage program.
Finally, Congress has preempted state law to protect lenders and the capital
markets even when a federal agency is not directly involved in the loan
relationship. When rapidly rising interest rates threatened the viability ofbanks,
savings and loan associations, and other lenders in the 1980s, Congress
preempted state law restrictions on the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses, 6
usury,217 and alternative mortgage instruments. 2 8 Although the usury law
preemption applied only to federally-related loans, Congress extended the dueon-sale clause and alternative mortgage instruments preemptions to statechartered lenders. Additionally, Congress has imposed affirmative obligations
on many, or in some cases all, state-chartered lenders pursuant to legislation such
as the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 219 which imposes disclosure
requirements concerning closing-related services and prohibits referral fees; the
Truth in Lending Act, 220 which imposes disclosure requirements concerning
finance charges; the Fair Housing Act,22' which prohibits discrimination in the
terms or availability of mortgage loans; and the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act,222 which requires lenders to publish information about their residential
lending activities.
These incursions by the federal government into the area of mortgage law
reflect both its desire for a more uniform and efficient system and its willingness
to displace state law with federal law. Congress's enactment of the Secondary
Mortgage Market Enhancement Act 2 demonstrates most pointedly its
willingness to act to assist the growth of the secondary mortgage market. The
importance of the foreclosure process to the desirability of mortgage securities
offerings may prompt Congress to preempt state law.
Congress may be particularly motivated to preempt state foreclosure laws
because past attempts to achieve voluntary national uniformity by the states have
failed. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has
promulgated two model acts that include mortgage foreclosure procedures-the

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See id. at 728.
12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (1994).
12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7 (1994).
12 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3806 (1994).
12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (1994 & Supp. 111996).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693 (1994 & Supp. 111996).
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994 & Supp. 111996).
12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2811 (1994 & Supp. U 1996).

223. See supra text accompanying note 157.
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Uniform Land Transactions Act" 4 and the Uniform Land Security Interest Act.m
Despite the benefits of uniformity in this area, neither Act has been adopted in
any state. Therefore, Congress may determine that federal imposition of uniform
foreclosure procedures would mark the end of a process by which the
traditionally personal relationship between borrower and lender has been
transformed to a transaction governed by the needs of the national market.
Because mortgage lending has become so focused on the national and
international markets, far less attention is paid to the local aspects of the
mortgage transaction. The traditional lender has become increasingly less
important as evidenced by the rapid growth of the mortgage banking industry.
Mortgage bankers offer potential borrowers an array of mortgage loan programs.
Providing information and choice is the mortgage banker's primary service to the
borrower. The mortgage banker will originate the loan but will not continue as
mortgagee for very long. Mortgage bankers typically sell the loans they
originate within 90 to 180 days.2 26 Although the mortgage banker may continue
to service the loan by collecting payments and performing related services,
information and choice apparently have become more important to borrowers
than a long-term personal relationship with a lender. In 1996, mortgage bankers
originated 57% of the $785.4 billion in new single-family residential mortgage
loans."2
But even loan origination has the potential to become increasingly
depersonalized. Just as technology has facilitated the sale of mortgage securities
by the secondary market, it facilitates loan originations. Computerized loan
origination networks (CLOs) are computer systems that provide information to
prospective borrowers about a variety of loan products and services. In addition,
some CLOs can process, underwrite, and originate loans. 28 Although the CLO
normally is operated from the office of a person with whom the borrower has
worked to buy property, such as a real estate agent or a builder, the borrower
may not have any personal contact with the lender making the loan.229 In fact,
the borrower may not even know who the lender is until the payment coupon
book arrives in the mail.

224.

Unif. Land Transactions Act §§ 3-501 to -513, 13 U.L.A. 469, 599-622

(1986).
225. Unif. Land Security Interest Act §§ 501-514, 7A U.L.A. 403, 449-73 (Supp.
1999).
226. See The Mortgage BankingProcess, CaliforniaMortgageBankersAssociation

<http:l www.cmba.com/html/mortgageprocess.htm>.
227. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOUsING & URBAN DEV., SURVEY OF MORTGAGE LENDING

ACTIVITY 1,2 (1997).
228. See HUD Statement of Policy 1996-1: Computer Loahi Origination Systems
(CLOs), 24 C.F.R. pt. 3500 (1998).
229. See Henry L. Judy, The U.S. ElectronicMortgageMarket, 12TH BIENNIAL
CONF. OF THE INT'L BAR ASS'N SECTION OF Bus. L. 18 (1995).
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Some CLOs have exceeded $1 billion in annual originations.' 3 Although
this dollar amount is large, it is a small percentage of the residential mortgage
origination market, which annually places hundreds of billions of dollars in
loans. But the efficiency of CLOs with the attendant decrease in transaction
costs makes computerized loan origination an attractive alternative for many
borrowers and lenders.
However, CLOs have a new rival for business-the Internet. During the
past few years, borrowers have been able to get information on a great variety
of loan programs and even to originate loans via the Intemet.2 1 With access to
loans from the solitude of home or office, prospective borrowers no longer need
to access information through a real estate agent's CLO, much less through a
loan officer at a bank or even a mortgage banker. Although Internet loan
programs are in their infancy, they present the specter of a future in which the
mortgage relationship is completely depersonalized. Whether called "lenderless
loans ' 32 or "paperless mortgages, ' '233 modem mortgages have evolved a great
deal since the time when lenders took possession of mortgaged land and were
responsible for its physical condition.
Mortgages now are owned by faceless groups of investors from around the
world. Loan transactions conform to the secondary market's standards, rather
than to the particulars of the borrower's needs, and the pressure of the market is
increasingly standardizing mortgage law and practice. The emphasis on
efficiency has shifted loan originations from the local lender to mortgage bankers
and potentially to the electronic realm. But these tremendous forces have been
yielding at least in part to the enormity of the societal problems that America is
confronting today. Just as economic forces caused the increasing distance
between mortgage holder and landowner, societal forces are causing the
relationship to contract.
III. THE THIRD ERA
Mortgage law has now entered its third era. The hallmark of this era is the
imposition of liabilities and responsibilities on mortgagees for the mortgaged
land, which represents a significant break with the past. The first era of
mortgage law was marked by increasing enhancement and protection of the

230. See Christopher M. Hess & Chris F. Kemerer, Computerized Loan
OriginationSystems: An Industry CaseStudy ofthe ElectronicMarketsHypothesis, MIS
Q., Sept. 1994, at 251, 262.
231. See James R DeBoth, The Internet is Reviving Computerized Loan
Origination,<http://banking.interest.con/sa960131.htm>; H. Jane Lehman, Shop for a
Home on the Internet?, 79 CONSUMERS' RES. MAG. 31 (1996), available in 1996 WL
9051709; BANK ADv. NEws, May 9, 1997, at 6, availablein 1997 WL 10158606.
232. See Preble, supra note 159, at 50.
233. See The Paperless Mortgage, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWs, Mar. 5, 1997,
availablein 1997 WL 8644333.
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lender's rights in the mortgaged land, which culminated in the Littletonian gage.
During the second era, when the debt became more important to lenders than the
mortgaged land, the law enhanced and protected the value of the debt with
holder-in-due-course status. At the same time, the lender became increasingly
removed from the mortgaged land. In contrast, the third era is characterized by
the imposition of burdens on mortgagees. The shift has been caused by the
enormity of some of the problems with which American society is
struggling-in particular, environmental degradation and crime. Largely
beginning in the 1980s, the government has enlisted the resources of financial
institutions to fight these battles, as well as a variety of smaller battles. The
effect has been to bring mortgagees closer to the mortgaged land.
A. Asset Forfeiture
Asset forfeiture laws are a striking example of the law's changed treatment
of lenders. Although forfeiture laws are of ancient origin and have existed in
this country for over two hundred years,"4 they were seldom enforced until the
1980s.2'- Law enforcement agencies have since been enforcing them with
breathtaking aggressiveness. The United States General Accounting Office
(GAO) reported that the value of inventoried properties seized by the
Departments of Justice and the Treasury increased from $33 million in 1979 to

234. The history of asset forfeiture law dates to Biblical times. If an object caused
the death of a person, the object or its value was forfeited to the state as a "deodand" to
be used in expiation for the death. "If an ox gore a man or a woman, and they die, he
shall be stoned and his flesh shall not be eaten." Exodus 21:28. As the religious
significance of forfeiture waned, government recognized that forfeiture served both as
a source of revenue and as a punishment for careless or criminal acts. Historically,
English law recognized three kinds of forfeiture: (1) deodand, (2) common-law
forfeiture, which forfeited the property of convicted felons and traitors to the Crown, and
(3) statutory forfeiture for property used in violation of the customs and revenue laws.
The United States adopted English statutory forfeiture law but not deodand or common
law forfeitures. See DAVID B. SMITH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE CASES
3-1 (1997) (stating forfeiture must be authorized by a specific statute). For a discussion
of the history of forfeiture, see 1 STEVEN L. KESSLER, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL FORFEITURE:
FEDERAL AND STATE PRACTICE § 1.02 (1997); George C. Pratt & William B. Peterson,
CivilForfeiturein the Second Circuit, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 653, 656-64 (1991) (tracing
the history of forfeiture in colonial and antebellum America and through "a substantial
body of case law on civil forfeiture" in the Second Circuit).
235. See U.S. GEN. AccT. OFF., ASSET FORFEITURE: A SELDOM USED TOOL IN
COMBATING DRUG TRAFFICKING (1981) [hereinafter ASSET FORFEITURE: A SELDOM
USED TOOL]; U.S. GEN. Accr. OFF., HIGH RISK SERIES: ASSET FORFEITURE PROGRAMS
(1995) [hereinafter HIGH RISK SERIES]; HR REP. No. 95-7, at 5 (1995), available in 1995

WL 234642 ("Although the government has had forfeiture authority for over 200 years,
it was rarely utilized as a law enforcement tool until the 1980s.").
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almost $2 billion in 1994.6 Hundreds of millions of dollars of assets have been
added to the federal Assets Forfeiture Fund since then?37 By 1993, the federal8
government alone had seized over 30,000 pieces of real and personal propertyD
based on over 140 federal forfeiture provisions.3 9 The states also have become
aggressive in their use of forfeiture laws.240 Many of these federal and state laws
can destroy a mortgage even if the lender has acted in complete good faith.
Moreover, the government may attempt to recoup payments already made to the

lender by arguing that they were made with forfeitable funds.24'
The government's interest in forfeiture initially was sparked by two major
criminal concerns-organized crime and the illegal drug trade. In 1970,
Congress enacted both the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO)242 to fight criminal organizations and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise
Act (CCE) to fight drug trafficking operations.243 Both laws include forfeiture

236. See HIGH RISK SERIES, supra note 235, at 2.
237. The Department of Justice reported that new assets worth $487.5 million were
added to the Fund in 1995, $338.1 million in 1996, and $110 million in the first quarter
of 1997. Civil Asset ForfeitureReform Act: Hearingson H.R. 1835 Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 116 (1997) (statement of Stefan D. Cassella,
Assistant Chief, Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, Criminal Division,
Department of Justice).
238. See Steven L. Schwartcz & Alan E. Rothman, Civil Forfeiture: A Higher
Form of CommercialLaw?, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 287, 289 (1993).
239. See KESSLER, supra note 234, § 7.01, at 7-3 (Release #6, 10/97). They cover
a wide variety of activities, including smuggling, copyright infringement, tax fraud,
money laundering, and drug trafficking. For a comprehensive listing of the federal
forfeiture statutes, see KESSLER, supranote 234, app. B; Elizabeth A. Skorcz, Comment,
RICO Forfeiture: Secured Lenders Beware, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1199, 1212-15 (1990)

(discussing RICO's forfeiture provisions). The Money Laundering Act, 18 U.S.C. § 981
(1994), is an example of a federal forfeiture statute that poses significant risks for lending
institutions. See Edward E. Sterling, Respondingto the Risks ofForfeiture (With Form),
394 PLI/REAL 445, 448 (1992) ("In the upcoming years, concern about the risk of
forfeiture of real property will probably be centered on the Money Laundering Act.").
240. For example, between 1989 and 1993, California state law enforcement
officials seized more than $170 million in assets pursuant to California forfeiture laws.
See Sarah Henry, The Thin Green Line, CAL. LAw., Sept. 1994, at 46,47. Assets of more

than $3 million were seized in a single New York county by the District Attorney
between 1990 and 1992. See Mary M. Cheb, Can Something This Easy, Quick, and
Profitablealso be Fair? Runaway Civil Forfeiture Stumbles on the Constitution, 39
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1, 48 n.16 (1994). In New Jersey, between 1986 and 1992, state
officials seized and sold more than $83 million in assets pursuant to New Jersey's
forfeiture laws. See Jay Romano, ProtestsMount over Police Confiscations,N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 1992, at 1.
241. See Skorcz, supra note 239, at 1202.
242. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
243. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1994).
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provisions. Many states have since enacted laws patterned after RICO 2" and
CCE, 245 as well as a wide variety of other forfeiture statutes.
Although organized crime and the illegal drug trade sparked the
government's interest, the explosive growth in the use of forfeiture is attributable
to a variety of other factors, including the increasing variety and number of
forfeiture laws,246 statutory amendments that expanded the reach of existing
forfeiture laws,247 and ballooning government expenditures to combat crime. 8
Aggressive use of forfeiture laws also can be motivated by racial prejudice 249 and
by efforts to boost arrest and seizure rates.250 However, the strongest impetus
may be financial self-interest. When addressing a group of law enforcement
personnel at a seminar on forfeitures, a United States Attorney reportedly said:
"Ladies and gentlemen, this is a gold mine." ' Through a procedure known as
"ear-marking," law enforcement agencies that carry out forfeitures often receive

244. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.901- .912 (West 1988); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§§ 946.80- .88 (West 1991); see also Paul Van Houten et al., RICO,28 AM. CRIM. L.
REV.637, 637 n. 1 (listing the thirty-one "little RICO" state laws).
245. The state laws often are based on the model civil drug forfeiture act, the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act (U.C.S.A.), which is patterned after the federal
Controlled Substances Act. UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES Acr §§ 101-607 (1970),
9 U.L.A. 652 (1997). The CCE was part of the Controlled Substances Act. See 21
U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1994).
246. See James Bovard, The DangerousExpansion ofForfeitureLaws, WALL ST.

J., Dec. 29, 1997, at All ("Asset forfeiture laws have been spreading like a computer
virus through the nation's statute books.").
247. For example, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 amended the

Controlled Substances Act to permit forfeiture of real property. See 21 U.S.C. §
881(a)(7) (1994).
248. See Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policingfor Profit: The Drug War's
Hidden EconomicAgenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 36 (1998) (stating that, in the effort to

combat the illegal drug trade in the United States, the federal government spends $15
billion annually and state governments spend $33 billion).
249. For examples of how forfeiture laws have been used to target and punish
minorities, see SMITH, supra note 234, § 1.01, at 1-25 to 1-28 & nn.12-13 (stating that:

(1) of 1,084 traffic stops videotaped in V61usia County, Florida, 69% of those stopped
were African-American or Hispanic although they constituted only five percent of the
motorists on the portion of the highway patrolled by Volusia County officers; (2) 82%

of the cars that police searched were driven by African-Americans or Hispanics; (3)
drivers got all their seized money back in only four of the 199 seizures in which no arrest

was made; (4) officers in Volusia County admitted that they were instructed to "target
minorities;" and (5)"racial targeting is the rule, rather than the exception, all over the
country").
250. See SMITH, supranote 234, § 1.01, at 1-8.
251. Judith Dennison Wolferts, In re One-Hundred Two Thousand Dollars, Cash-

Friendly Civil Forfeiture, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 971, 971 (quoting Dan Luzadder, "Gold
Mine" Praisedat Seminarfor Forfeitures,ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Aug. 11, 1991, at
8).
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part of the proceeds from forfeited assets. 2 Forjurisdictions that authorize earmarking, property seizures can provide low- or under-budgeted law enforcement
agencies with an important source of revenue. 3 Evidence exists that some
agencies use the forfeiture laws as a means to establish financial independence
or semi-independence. 4
Courts, legislators, and many others255 have criticized current forfeiture
practices as being abusive and uncontrolled. For example, in UnitedStates v. All
Assets ofStatewideAuto Parts,Inc., the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
"We continue to be enormously troubled by the government's increasing and
virtually unchecked use of the civil forfeiture statutes and the disregard for due
' The GAO has labeled asset forfeiture
process that is buried in those statutes."256
7
a "high risk"' area, a term used to designate federal programs that are
"especially vulnerable to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement., 25 ' The
GAO's concerns with forfeiture range from the mismanagement and
misappropriation of seized property to the overzealous use of forfeiture by

252. The federal Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 established the earmarking of forfeited assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 524 (1994). Many state forfeiture laws also
contain earmarking provisions. See SMITH, supra note 234, at 1-8.1.
253. See Georgia v. Bell (In re Bell), 215 B.R. 266, 270 n.8 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1997) ("[U]nderfunded and hard-pressed government and law enforcement agencies
could easily become accustomed to the large revenue created through civil forfeiture of
drug-related property.") (citing Wolferts, supranote 251); John Dillin, Government'sBig
Grab Civil Forfeiture, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 5, 1993, at 6 (noting that "cash-

strapped" jurisdictions may use forfeiture proceeds to buy new law enforcement
equipment or to pay a portion of officers' salaries), available in 1993 WL 7156676.
254. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 248, passim.
255. See, e.g., Amendments to the Unif. Controlled Substances Act (1990): Article
V. Civil Forfeiture, at 5 (stating that the government's use of the forfeiture laws has
"confirmed that prosecutorial discretion cannot alone provide sufficient protection of
important legal interests."), reprintedin 3 KESSLER, supra note 234, at 1-38; Blumenson
&Nilsen, supranote 248, at 37 (asserting that the "forfeiture laws.., are producing selffinancing, unaccountable law enforcement agencies divorced from any meaningful
legislative oversight. There are numerous examples of such semi-independent agencies
targeting assets with no regard for the rights, safety, or even lives of the suspects");
Henry, supra note 240, at 46, 48 (stating that California "county governments and law
enforcement departments have milked the asset-forfeiture program to fund other
operations; and overeager police have injured-even killed-innocent citizens in raids
that critics charge were motivated by the promise of asset-forfeiture booty").
256. 971 F.2d 896, 905 (2d Cir. 1992).
257. See HIGH RISK SERIES, supra note 235.
258. See HIGH RISK SERIES, supra note 235. The perception of law enforcement's
use of the forfeiture laws has changed dramatically in recent years. Only fourteen years
before characterizing asset forfeiture as a high risk area, the GAO labeled forfeiture a
"seldom used tool." ASSET FORFEITURE: A SELDOM USED TOOL, supra note 235, cited
in HIGH RISK SERIES, supra note 235.
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'
agencies that have "vested interests in receiving the proceeds of forfeitures."259
6
Congress has held hearings relating to abuses offorfeiture laws,' and forfeiture
reform legislation has been introduced in the Senate and in the House.2 6' Courts
and commentators
have been particularly harsh in their criticism of ear262
marking.
Despite the government's aggressive use of the forfeiture laws and
mounting criticisms of seizures, courts construing the laws have been remarkably
callous toward mortgagees and owners of other interests in seized property. In
forfeiture actions, courts routinely and explicitly sacrifice an innocent
individual's private property interest to serve public purposes. For example, in
Calero-Toledov. PearsonYacht Leasing Co.,2 63 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of a seizure of property from an owner that was innocent of
any wrongdoing. The Court upheld the seizure on the basis that forfeiture
furthers the community goods of deterring crime and punishing wrongdoing.
The Court also upheld the forfeiture on the basis that it creates an incentive for
lenders and others to act in the best interests of the community: "To the extent
that such forfeiture provisions are applied to lessors, bailors, or secured creditors
who are innocent of any wrongdoing, confiscation may have the desirable effect
of inducing them to exercise greater care in transferring possession of their
2 65
property. ' 264 The Supreme Court recently strongly reaffirmed this holding.
State courts have been equally unsympathetic to claims by innocent owners,
including innocent lenders. For example, in Commonwealth v. One 1978 Ford
Van, 2' the Massachusetts Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of a state
forfeiture law that destroyed a lender's security interest in seized property. The
trial court expressly found that the lender "had done all that reasonably could be
expected of it to insure that the [seized property] would not be used in violation

259. HIGH RISK SERIES, supra note 235, at 234, 650.

260. See Civil Asset Forfeiture: Hearingson H.R. 1835 Before the House Comm.
on the Judiciary,105th Cong. (1997).
261. Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL) introduced the Civil Asset Forfeiture
Reform Act of 1993 in the House as H.R. 2417. Senator James M. Jeffords (R-VT)
introduced similar legislation in the Senate as S.1665. Several other proposals have been
introduced, but Congress has yet to enact a major forfeiture reform bill. See SMITH,
supra note 234, at 1-20 to -22.1 & n.8, for a thorough tracking of the reform bills in
Congress.

262. See SMITH, supra note 234, § 1.01, at 1-8.1 & n.21.1 (criticizing the earmarking policy and listing several courts that also have criticized the practice); see also
Blumenson & Nilsen, supranote 244.
263. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
264. Id. at 687-88.
265. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S.Ct. 994 (1996).
266. 419 N.E.2d 1060 (Mass. Ct. App. 1981). But cf Threlkeld v. Mississippi, 586
So. 2d 756, 759 (Miss. 1991); New Jersey v. One 1976 Pontiac Firebird, 402 A.2d 254,
258 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
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of the narcotic drug laws." 267 Despite the lender's diligence, the appellate court
held that its security interest was eliminated and that the forfeiture was not
unconstitutional. The court's opinion reflects its indifference to the loss that the
forfeiture law inflicted on the blameless lender:
As a sizeable commercial financing house, Ford [Motor Credit
Company] must have foreseen and taken into account the occasional
loss of a security interest to forfeiture. Moreover, forfeiture does not
extinguish the underlying debt which remains enforceable against the
maker of the note and any indorsers. While the principal debtor's
status after conviction may render collection on the note impractical,
that factor alone would not require invalidation of the forfeiture as an
unconstitutional taking.268
As in Calero-Toledo,the court justified this result on the ground that the public
good is served by forfeitures because they raise revenue for law enforcement,
penalize wrongdoing, and prevent further illegal use of seized property.269
Calero-Toledoand One 1978 Ford Van represent a profound change in the
law's treatment of secured lenders. During the first eight hundred years of
mortgage law's development, the law reflected a paramount concern for lenders'
best interests. Lenders' possession of mortgaged land with no obligation to
account to the owner and the holder-in-due-course doctrine are two notable
examples of the special status that the law traditionally has afforded lenders.
The regular use of the forfeiture laws to destroy security interests and to force
lenders to act as a "private police force"270 for the benefit of the community
sharply breaks with this tradition.
The unfairness of imposing this burden on an innocent person for the
community good has prompted legislatures to include an "innocent owner"

267. One 1978 Ford Van, 419 N.E.2d at 1061.

268. Id. at 1064.
269. See id.
270. Commentators have argued that requiring lenders to act as a private police

force for potential criminal activity is fundamentally unjust. See, e.g., Brief of the
Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4, Bennis v. Michigan,
516 U.S. 442 (1996) (No. 94-8729). But cf.Dime Savings Bank FinallyFreeofLow-Doc
Investigation by U.S., NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, May 27, 1996 (reporting statements by
a New York bank official that the bank has aided the government in cases of bank fraud
and will continue to cooperate with the government), available in 1996 WL 11670009.
The government has stated that it intentionally has enlisted lenders as watchdogs.
"Financial institutions are in a unique position to assist law enforcement at the federal
and state levels by reporting suspicious transactions that might indicate money
laundering."
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., REPORT, MONEY LAUNDERING: NEEDED
IMPROVEMENTS FOR REPORTING SUSPICIOUs TRANSACTIONS ARE PLANNED, May 30,

1995, at 36 (No. GAO/GGD-95-156).
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defense in many forfeiture laws. However, not all innocent owner defenses
apply to land. In Wisconsin, for example, the defense applies only to seized
vehicles.27' In other jurisdictions, courts deny the defense to mortgagees by
construing the word "owner" to exclude them.272 But even when a mortgagee
comes within the scope ofthe innocent owner defense, the protection it affords
can be more apparent than real for three reasons: (1) forfeiture laws have
differing and ambiguous standards and procedures for successfully asserting the
defense; (2) even if a lender satisfies the requirements of the innocent owner
defense, it still may lose its mortgage based on the "relation back" doctrine; and
(3) lenders that satisfy the innocent owner standard may be unable to recoup the
full amount of the outstanding debt in the forfeiture proceeding and may be
unable to foreclose the mortgage.
1. Standards and Procedures
Statutory definitions of an "innocent owner" are necessarily somewhat
vague. For example, RICO defines an innocent owner as a person who was
"reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to
forfeiture." 273 Similarly, Treasury regulations promulgated pursuant to the
federal Asset Forfeiture Amendments Act of 1988 provide that an owner is
innocent if it "reasonably attempted to ascertain the use of the property in a
normal and customary manner" and "did not know or consent to the illegal use
of the property or, in the event that the [owner] knew or should have known of
the illegal use, the [owner] did what reasonably could have been expected to
prevent the violation."274 Terms such as "reasonably," "knew or should have
known," and "normal and customary manner" are extremely malleable and
provide little concrete guidance to lenders attempting to structure loan
transactions in a manner that will satisfy the requirements of the innocent owner
defense.
The lack of statutory guidance is compounded by conflicting judicial
interpretations. In determining whether an owner "knew" of illegal activity,
some courts have held that an owner is innocent if it did not have actual
knowledge. 75 Other courts have interpreted the word "knew" to incorporate a

271. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 961.55(1)(d)(4) (West 1991).
272. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. One 1978 Ford Van, 419 N.E.2d 1060, 1062-63
(Mass. Ct. App. 1981). Some jurisdictions have enacted separate innocent secured party
statutes. See, e.g., UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES Acr § 505(f), 9 U.L.A. 638-39
(1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 961.55 (West 1991).

273. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1994).
274. 19 C.F.R. § 171.52(c)(ii), (iii) (1998).
275. See Republic Nat'l Bank v. United States, 506 U.S. 80 (1992); United States
v. 6960 Miraflores Ave., 995 F.2d 1558 (1lth Cir. 1993), cert. granted sub nom.
Republic Nat'l Bank v. United States, 502 U.S. 1090, rev'd on other grounds, 506 U.S.
80 (1992); United States v. 141st Street Corp., 911 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1990); United
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negligence standard; even if the owner did not have actual knowledge, it is not
an innocent owner if it could have learned about the illegal activity by
conducting a reasonable investigation. 6
Similarly, courts have differed in their interpretation of the innocent owner
standard contained in the federal Controlled Substances Act and in many state

laws. Under those laws, the illegal activity must have occurred "without the

knowledge or consent of" the allegedly innocent owner.277 In addition to the

differing interpretations of the word "knowledge" described above, courts differ
on whether the standard is conjunctive or disjunctive. Courts that interpret the
standard conjunctively require an owner to prove both lack of knowledge and
lack of consent.278 Courts that interpret the standard disjunctively hold that an
owner is innocent if it either did not know of the illegal activity or, if it did
know, did not consent. 79 Because of these differing interpretations, under the
same set of loan procedures a lender could be an innocent owner in one
jurisdiction but not in another. This difference in interpretation can be a
particular problem for the secondary mortgage market. Moreover, the
definitions of an "innocent owner" impose on the lender the difficult burden of
proving a negative-that it did not know or consent.
In addition to the difficulties of proving innocent owner status, the statute's
procedural requirements impose burdens both when the loan is made and when
forfeiture proceedings begin. Some forfeiture laws impose pre-loan
requirements on lenders and destroy the lender's security interest if it fails to
comply. For example, in South CarolinaState Law Enforcement Division v.
Crook,280 an innocent lender lost its security interest because it did not comply
with a state forfeiture law that required lenders to inquire into the borrower's
character before making a loan and to obtain the borrower's affidavit that she has
never been charged or convicted of a drug law violation.28'

States v. A Fee Simple Parcel of Real Property Situated in Bal Harbour, 650 F. Supp.
1534 (E.D. La. 1987); Missouri v. 1973 Fleetwood Mobile Home, 802 S.W.2d 582 (Mo.
1991); see also KESSLER, supra note 234, § 11.06[10], at 11-203.
276. See United States v. $215,300 United States Currency, 882 F.2d 417 (9th Cir.
1989); State v. Singleton, 396 So. 2d 1050, 1053-54 (Ala. 1981); Pugh v. Alabama ex
rel. Galanos, 441 So. 2d 931 (Ala. Ct. App. 1983); Alaska v. Rice, 626 P.2d 104 (Alaska
1981).

277. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1994).
278. See, e.g., United States v. 6640 SW 48th St., 41 F.3d 1448, 1452-53 (11th Cir.
1995) ("We have described Section 881(a)(7) as reflecting 'two interrelated aims of
Congress: to punish criminals while ensuring that innocent persons are not penalized for
their unwitting association with wrongdoers."') (citations omitted).
279. See, e.g., United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794, 805 (3d Cir.

1994); United States v. 6109 Grubb Road, 886 F.2d 618, 626 (3d Cir. 1989).
280. 255 S.E.2d 846 (S.C. 1979).
281. See id. at 847-48 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-530(5a) (Law Co-op 1976)).
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Obtaining a borrower's affidavit and investigating the borrower's character,
by themselves, do not appear to be unduly burdensome, at least if the statute
specifies how the inquiry should be conducted. However, statutory pre-loan
requirements do not all come from one forfeiture law. Instead, the mortgaged
land is subject to seizure under a wide variety of federal and state forfeiture laws,
each of which may have its own requirements. To be safe, a lender would have
to structure the loan transaction to satisfy each one.
In contrast, when the forfeiture proceeding begins, the lender needs to
comply with only one law. However, the lender may confront a different type
of problem. A lender will lose its security interest if it does not declare and

defend its interest in the forfeiture proceeding in accordance with statutory
procedures. 282 For example, in Key Bank v. City of Everett,283 a bank lost its
security interest because it failed to give written notice of its claim to the
appropriate law enforcement agency. However, not all forfeiture laws require
the government to give secured lenders personal notice of a forfeiture
proceeding. 284 Therefore, the lender's time to file its claim may expire before it
even knows about the proceedings.
2. Relation Back Doctrine
Even if a lender complies with all the statutory requirements and convinces
the government or a court that it is an innocent owner, the lender still might lose
its mortgage or the debt payments it has received. Pursuant to the relation back
doctrine, title to forfeited property vests in the government as soon as the illegal
act is committed, rather than when the forfeiture proceedings are complete.
Therefore, after property has been used in connection with an illegal activity, any
conveyance of the property by the apparent owner is void because title already
has vested in the government. The doctrine is designed to prevent an owner
from thwarting a forfeiture action by transferring the property. However, the
doctrine applies even against innocent purchasers, including innocent
mortgagees, even though no public record gives notice of the land's forfeitable
status.
Fortunately, in 1993, the United States Supreme Court limited the impact
of the relation back doctrine on innocent owners. In United States v. 92 Buena

282. John J. Byrne, When the Government Says "Mine," 83 A.B.A. BANKING J.
61, 62 (1991), available in1991 WL 2858302.
283. 841 P.2d 800, 801 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). The notice requirement is codified
at WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(d) (1988). The court rejected the bank's argument that
it was not an "owner" within the meaning of the statute because it merely held a security
interest in the seized property. Key Bank, 841 P.2d at 802.
284. See,e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 1316.75 (1998) (notice by publication for forfeitures
under the Controlled Substances Act); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4171(c) (1992) (notice by
publication); MICH. COmP. LAWS ANN. § 333.7523(a) (West 1992) (notice by
publication); KESSLER, supra note 234, §§ 11.03[2], [4], [5], [8], [9].
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Vista Avenue, 285 the Court held that the relation back provision in the federal
Controlled Substances Act2 6 did not override the Act's innocent owner defense.
The Court correctly reasoned that a contrary interpretation essentially would
nullify the innocent owner defense whenever the illegal conduct occurred before
the innocent owner acquired its interest in the property.8 7 Because the Court's
decision rests on the well-established rule of construction that a statute should
be interpreted so as to give effect to all its parts, the Court's reasoning should be
persuasive to courts interpreting other federal and state forfeiture laws.
However, the Court's holding will not protect a lender from the relation back
doctrine if the applicable forfeiture law does not include an innocent owner
defense. In that case, the lender's mortgage will be void if it was given after the
land was used in connection with an illegal activity.
3. Scope of Recovery
Even when an innocent owner defense is available and a mortgagee
manages to qualify for it, the mortgagee may not recover the entire outstanding
debt in the forfeiture proceeding. Although courts uniformly hold that a
mortgagee can recover the outstanding principal and interest that accrued before
seizure of the property, courts are split concerning the mortgagee's right to

recover post-seizure interest and the attorneys' fees and costs incurred to defend

its mortgage in the forfeiture proceeding.2"' Courts also are split concerning the
mortgagee's right to foreclose the mortgage after forfeiture proceedings are
commenced.28 9 Therefore, even those mortgagees who fare the best in a
forfeiture action may recover less than the entire debt, may have to absorb the
expense of defending its lien, and may be unable to exercise the most important
right granted by a mortgage-the right to foreclose."
These very real and substantial potentials for loss in a forfeiture proceeding
have provided strong motivation for lenders to become well acquainted with
prospective borrowers and with the land they offer as security. In an attempt to

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

507 U.S. 111 (1993).
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1994).
92 Buena Vista Avenue, 507 U.S. at 124.
See KESSLER, supra note 234, § 7.03[1].
See KESSLER, supra note 234, § 7.03[1][a][iv].
In 1991, the Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture of the Department of

Justice provided limited relief for mortgagees when it promulgated the Expedited
Forfeiture Settlement Policy for Mortgage Holders. Pursuant to this Policy, the Justice
Department can settle claims made by mortgagees. Mortgagees are paid for their
perfected mortgages and convey their security interest to the government. The payment
includes principal, accrued interest to the date of payment, and casualty insurance
premium payments made by the mortgagee. However, the mortgagee may recover its
attorneys' fees and costs "only in exceptional circumstances."
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avoid forfeiture, one author recommends that lenders take the following steps
before making a loan:
A. Tour the customer's business to be sure it is legitimate.
B. Interview employeesconcerning the nature and propriety of
the customer's business.
C. Analyze the financial situation of the borrower and guarantors.
Review Financial Statements:
a. Substantiate sources of income; confirm
employment and income levels;
b. Compare income levels to education and
experience level of borrower/guarantor;
c. If possible, compare financial statements to recent
tax returns to see if there is any hidden income;
d. Be wary of foreign (or non-local) sources of
money or collateral;
e. Substantiate sources of assets; compare to income
level.
D. Ascertain relationship of borrowing entity or person to related
entities or persons.
E. Obtain and review a search of judgments, liens, lis pendens.
F. Consider reviews of databases which include news and financial
information and reported cases.
G. Do not rely exclusively on references from other bankers or
financial backers.
H. Be wary of fast-talking or big-name borrowers.2"
The depth and breadth of these recommended investigations demonstrate the
concern that lenders have about the loss of their loan security in the event of a
forfeiture. And the concern continues throughout the life of the loan. After
making a mortgage loan, careful mortgagees continue monitoring the mortgaged
land.
The extra investigations that lenders must conduct because of the forfeiture
laws have increased the costs of lending, increased interest rates, and decreased
access to mortgage funds.292 Moreover, lenders are hampered in conducting the
investigations by uncertainty concerning the standard of care they must exercise
to qualify for the innocent owner defense.293 Because a mortgage derives its
291. Sterling, supranote 239, at 448.
292. Brief of Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondent at 22, United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 507 U.S. 111
(1993) (No. 91-781).
293. See Craig L. Webb, Home Lenders Better Beware as Forfeiture Cases
Increase,MORTGAGE MARKETPLACE, June 7, 1993 (stating that courts have not provided
lenders with adequate guidelines regarding forfeiture laws), available in 1993 WL
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value from certainty, questions concerning its forfeitability harm not only
borrowers and lenders, but also the lending industry and the economy as a
whole.294 These significant negative effects on lending clearly demonstrate the
extent to which forfeiture laws have forced lenders to focus increased attention
to the lands on which they hold mortgages.
B. EnvironmentalLiabilities
Though of much more recent origin than forfeiture law, environmental law

has evolved relatively quickly to create potential liability for mortgagees far in
excess of their potential liability in a forfeiture action. As a result of a forfeiture,
a mortgagee may lose its mortgage, and the secured debt may become
unrecoverable. Like forfeiture laws, environmental laws can destroy a mortgage
and render the borrower insolvent so that the debt is uncollectible. However, an
environmental law also can make a mortgagee personally liable for millions of
dollars 295 and can subject it to criminal charges. 96 A mortgagee also may be

3086406. Some courts have held that the bank must exercise "reasonable diligence." See
Alabama v. Johnston, 565 So. 2d 262, 263 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990) (holding that the bank

could not prevent illegal use of the property and, therefore, its security interest was not
forfeitable). Other courts have required only that the innocent owner prove a valid
security interest in the property to prevent forfeiture. See Utah v. One 1979 Pontiac
Trans Am, 771 P.2d 682, 685 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stating that under a state criminal
forfeiture statute, the secured interest is preserved from forfeiture once the secured party
establishes that it has an actual good faith interest in the property not obtained by fraud
or deceit); cf Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689 (1974)
(stating in dictum that a truly innocent owner may be exempt from forfeiture if "he was
uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that
reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property...
(emphasis added).
294. See Brief of Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation as Amicus Curiae in
Support of the Respondent at 5, United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 507 U.S. 111
(1993) (No. 91-781) ("[T]he bedrock of the mortgage industry ispredictability.... [T]he
foundation of the industry is the stability and reliability of the enforceable home
mortgage."); Brief of American Bankers Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 5, United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 507 U.S. 111 (1993) (No. 91781) ("The lack of certainty on the scope of liability under various laws... has forced
banks to withhold credit or somehow restrict the flow of funds to otherwise worthy
customers. This obviously has had a negative effect on the economy.") (footnote
omitted); see also David R. Fine & Raymond P. Pepe, Bennis v. Michigan and Innocent

Owners in Civil Forfeiture: Balancing Legitimate Goals with Due Process and
Reasonable Expectations, 5 GEO. MASON L. REv. 595, 620-23 (1997) (stating that the
potential for forfeiture imposes significant burdens on financial institutions).
295. See infra text accompanying notes 334-37.
296. For example, see Commonwealth v. Advantage Bank, 550 N.E.2d 1388 (Mass.
1990), in which a bank was criminally charged under a state lead-based paint law for
failing to correct lead-based paint violations in a building on which it held a mortgage.
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held liable as a defendant in a toxic tort lawsuit. 297 In an attempt to avoid such

liability, lenders now bear the burdens of conducting environmental inspections
of lands offered as collateral and of requiring borrowers to correct any
environmental violations before a loan will be made. In these ways, government
has conscripted lenders to enforce the environmental laws, as well as to help
fund environmental cleanups.
1. Inspections and Corrections
As with forfeiture laws, a myriad of federal, state, and local environmental
laws affect real property. Environmental laws regulate virtually every aspect of
the environment, including air, water, underground storage tanks,3 1 S0li 3 1
3 2 wastes, pesticides, 30 3 endangered
and hazardous
species and
their habitats, 3°4
305
36
3a 7
30 8
39
3 10
lead,

asbestos,

0

radon,

radiation,

noise,

0

and mining.

Some of these

297. "Toxic tort liability has increased dramatically since 1980 under state
common law," and there has been talk of creating a new federal tort or administrative
compensation system for personal injury and property damage due to toxic substances.
1 Envtl. Due Diligence Guide (BNA) 101:19 (1999). A court also may hold a lender
liable for pollution based on a common law aiding-and-abetting theory. See id. at
101:20.
298. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994).
299. See, e.g, Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(1994); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445
(1994); Safe Drinking Water (Public Health Service Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26
.(1994).
300. See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991-6991i
(1994) (Subtitle I) (amending the Solid Waste Disposal Act); ALA. CODE § 22-36-6
(1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT. Ann. § 49-1017 (West 1997); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 25299.70 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999).
301. See, e.g., Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994).
302. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and

Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-451(a)
(West 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6301-6319 (1991 & Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT.
ANN. ch. 403.702 (West 1998); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-8-90 to 12-8-99 (1991 & Supp.
1998).
303. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§
136-136y (1994).

304. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1534 (1994).
305. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. pt. 35 (1998); 40 C.F.R. pt. 745 (1998); ARK. CODEANN.
§ 20-27-607(a), (b) (Michie 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-8 (West 1995); 410
ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/11 (West 1997); IOWA CODE §§ 135.100-.105B (1997); KY. REV.

STAT. ANN. §§ 211.900-.905) (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1996).
306. See, e.g., Occupational Exposure to Asbestos Standards, 29 C.F.R. §§
1910.1001, 1915.1001, 1926.1101 (1998); 40 C.F.I § 61.145 (1998); ALASKA STAT. §§
18.31.010-.050 (Michie 1991); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/1 (West 1997).
307. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 211.855-.856 (Michie 1995); Maine Dep't
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laws provide circumstances under which a mortgagee can be personally liable
for pollution. But even those laws that do not create a direct personal risk for
lenders create substantial indirect risks that motivate lenders to act as
environmental watchdogs. Enforcement of an environmental law can adversely
affect or destroy both the borrower's ability to repay the loan and the value of
the security for the loan.
If the government enforces an environmental law against a borrower, the
borrower may be liable for large costs to correct the violation and for penalties
and fines. The borrower might even be imprisoned. In either event, the
borrower's ability to repay the loan can be impaired or destroyed. Additionally,
the borrower's ability to repay the loan can be seriously compromised if a
necessary environmental permit is revoked, denied, or made subject to
conditions that prevent the borrower's business from operating profitably.
If the borrower is unable to repay the loan for one of these reasons, the
lender's recourse against the security also may be adversely affected. The
environmental contamination may cause the land's value to diminish to less than
the outstanding debt or cause the land to have a negative value because the
cleanup cost will exceed the land's value even after the contamination is
eliminated. 31' To compound this problem, the stigma of former contamination
often continues to depress the land's value even after a cleanup.312
Aside from the mortgaged land, the mortgage itself may become worthless.
If the government incurs expenses in assessing or correcting an environmental
problem on the mortgaged land, some state statutes give the government a lien
on the land that takes priority over existing liens. 1 3 Under this type of statute,
a mortgage will be subordinated to the environmental "superlien" even if the
mortgage was recorded before the environmental problem existed. If the
superlien secures a debt greater than the land's value, which can easily happen,
the mortgage is worthless. If the government exercises its right to sell the

of Human Servs. Regs., CODE ME. R. ch. 330 § 19 (1999).
308. See, e.g., Atomic Energy Act, 42, U.S.C. §§ 2011 to 22 9 7 g-4 (1994).
309. See, e.g., Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1994); Clean Air Act,

42 U.S.C. §§ 7641-7642 (1994).
310. See, e.g., Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201,
1202, 1211 (1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 49-428 (1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:905.4
(West 1989); MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 15-1107 (1994).
311. See Should GovernmentAgencies and PrivateLendingInstitutions be Forced
to Pay Enormous Sums to Clean Up Environmental Contamination They Did Not

Cause?: Hearingon S. 651 Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing,and Urban Affairs,
102d Cong. 53, 61, 65-66 (1991) (testimony of L. William Seidman, Chair, Federal
Deposit Insur. Corp.) [hereinafter Hearingon S. 651].
312. See 2 Envtl. Due Diligence Guide (BNA) 501:8505 (1999).
313. See, e.g, CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-452a (West 1995); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 30:2281 (West 1989 & Supp. 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1371 (West
1989 & Supp. 1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21E, § 13 (1994).
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property to satisfy the debt secured by the superlien, the mortgage will be
extinguished.
Not all statutory environmental liens are superliens. Some are subject to the
same priority rules as mortgages.314 Even if the government's lien is junior to the
mortgage, however, it can create risks for the mortgagee. If the total debt
secured by the property, including debts secured by the mortgage and by the
government's lien, exceeds the land's value, the owner may have little incentive
to continue making payments on the debts, particularly if state laws or the loan
agreement protect the owner from liability beyond the loss of the land.315
The risks of borrower default and of destruction of the mortgage's value
provide strong inducements to lenders to avoid lending money on the security
of environmentally contaminated property. The possibility that environmental
liability might render a lender insolvent has prompted the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to require that lenders conduct an environmental
assessment before making a loan to be secured by almost any commercial real
estate and, increasingly, by residential real estate. The FDIC also requires
lenders to monitor the property and the borrower during the life of the loan for
any possible sources of environmental contamination.316 If the property presents
a minimal risk of contamination, such as a home in an established residential
area, the assessment may be conducted by a layperson, such as the loan officer.
For any other type of property, however, a professional environmental inspector
must perform the assessment.1 7

The FDIC guidelines warn that bank examiners will investigate the lender's
environmental risk program and its compliance with that program. If an
examiner determines that the lender has not implemented an adequate
environmental risk program, the bank may be criticized, subjected to heightened
scrutiny, fined, and subjected to stricter control by the examiners. 3 8 The Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency has promulgated similar environmental
inspection standards for banks engaged in asset management activities. 3 9

314. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 46.08.075 (Michie 1996); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 49-295 (West 1997); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-7-417(a) to -516(a) (Michie 1992).
315. For example, the owner might be protected by antideficiency legislation. See
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 113, § 8.3. The owner also would be protected if the
mortgage provided that the owner is not personally liable for the debt, which is
commonly known as a "nonrecours6 loan." See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 113,
§ 2.1, at 17-19.
316. See FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSUR. CORP., GUIDELINES FOR AN ENVIRONMENTAL
RISK PROGRAM 8 (1993), available in 1993 FDIC Interp. Ltr. LEXIS 69, *10-* 11
[hereinafter FDIC GUIDELINES].

317. See id. at *9-*10.
318. See Malcolm D. Griggs, Lender Liability and Environmental Risk
Management, 67 FLA. B.J. 80, 83-84 (1993).
319. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, EXAMINING CIRCULAR
256 (1991), available in 1991 WL 434657, at *9-*10.
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The secondary mortgage market also has been a strong force in requiring
lenders to establish environmental risk programs. For example, Fannie Mae
requires that, for every multi-family mortgage it buys, the original lender must
have conducted an environmental assessment of the mortgaged land and must
continue to monitor the property during the life of the loan.320 Fannie Mae
expressly requires lenders to become knowledgeable about all federal, state, and
local laws affecting health, safety, or the environment. To create an incentive
to fulfill these duties responsibly, the lender is liable to Fannie Mae for all
warranties, representations, and certifications that the lender must give
concerning the land's environmental condition. To further protect itself, Fannie
Mae will not buy a mortgage on lands that are most likely to be contaminated,
such as waste disposal sites or properties that adjoin contaminated property.
Fannie Mae also requires lenders to obtain promises from borrowers to report all
violations of environmental laws and to correct all such 'violations. Fannie
Mae's importance as a purchaser in the secondary market has made this
institution, created in the apex of the second era of mortgage law, into a powerful
force for implementing the requirements of the third era.
In light of the wide variety of environmental laws, a properly conducted
environmental assessment includes many aspects of the property and of the
borrower's use of the property. Model procedures for environmental risk
programs direct lenders to inspect the property for a broad range of
environmental risks and warning signs, including: (1) underground storage
tanks, (2) equipment contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), (3)
asbestos-containing material, (4) lead-based paint, (5) radon, (6) unpermitted air
emissions or waste water discharges, (7) urea formaldehyde foam insulation, (8)
public drinking water supplies that exceed EPA's lead concentration level limits,
(9) indications of mishandling of pesticides, herbicides, rodenticides, fertilizers,
paints, solvents, and maintenance chemicals, (10) stained soil, (11) hazardous
waste generation, (12) contaminated fill dirt, and (13) denuded or stressed
vegetation."' As additional means of uncovering potential environmental
problems, the model procedures direct lenders to (1) examine past ownership and
use of the property and of adjacent properties to determine whether they
previously have been used for businesses that generate pollution, (2) review the
borrower's records concerning its use and disposal of hazardous substances, (3)
review the public records for any citations of the borrower for violating an
environmental law, (4) review state and federal lists of contaminated properties,
and (5) interview the property's owner, occupants, and workers.3 And this is
just a Phase I assessment.3 If the Phase I assessment raises any questions about

320.

See

FANNIE MAE

DUS

GUIDE,

pt. X

-

ENvIRONMENTAL HAZARDS

MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES (1994).

321. See 2 Envtl. Due Diligence Guide (BNA) 501:8508 to :8518 (1999).
322. See id. at 501:8507.
323. Id. ASTM (formerly the American Society for Testing and Materials) has
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the property's environmental condition, the lender may require a more intensive
investigation, known as a Phase II assessment. 324 Even if the Phase I assessment
does not reveal any problems, lenders continue to monitor the property during
the life of the loan in an attempt to avoid the losses that can occur if the property
becomes polluted. 3z
If the inspector discovers pollution on the property, the lender will not make
the loan unless the borrower first corrects the problem.326 For example, if the
inspector discovers an underground storage tank on the property that does not
comply with relevant regulations, model underwriting standards instruct lenders
not to make the loan unless the borrower brings the tank into compliance with
the regulations and takes soil samples from around the tank and performs a
sample analysis of the tank's contents to prove that the tank has not leaked. If
a tank is no longer in use or if the borrower is unable to prove that the tank has
not leaked, the lender is instructed to deny the loan unless the borrower (1)
removes the tank or, if removal is impossible, closes the tank in place, (2)
performs soil and groundwater sampling and a sample analysis of the tank's
contents, and (3) contracts for a cleanup if the analysis shows that the tank has
leaked. The underwriting standards impose similarly stringent requirements for
all the other types of pollutants included in the environmental assessment.327
By essentially conscripting lenders both to inspect properties and to require
environmental cleanups, the government has created a regulatory system many
times more comprehensive and efficient than the government could achieve
alone. Under this system, virtually every parcel of commercial real estate in this
country will be subjected to an environmental inspection because virtually every
property owner borrows money and gives a mortgage when purchasing the
property or at some other time during its period of ownership. Moreover, the
inspections are conducted at no cost to the government, which is no small benefit
because environmental appraisals generally cost between $2,500 and $10,000,
and can be much more costly. 328 It has been estimated that, in connection with

issued standards for conducting environmental assessments. The standards are intended
to provide guidance concerning the types of inspections that should be undertaken to
qualify for an "innocent owner" defense. The Standard Practice for a Phase I
Environmental Site Assessment is designated E 1527-97.
324. The standard practice for a Phase II Environmental Site Assessment is E 190397.
325. The environmental risk assessment should continue during the life of the loan
by monitoring the borrower and the real property collateral for potential environmental
concerns. The institution should be aware of changes in the business activities of the
borrower that result in a significant increased risk of environmental liability associated
with the real property collateral. FDIC GUIDELINES, supra note 316, at 11.
326. Envtl. Due Diligence (BNA): The Complete Resource Guidefor Real Estate
Lenders, Buyers, Sellers and Attorneys, at 1 (1999).

327. See 2 Envtl. Due Diligence Guide (BNA) 501:8508 to :8509 (1999).
328. William Holt, Minimizing Environmental Risks, J. COMMERCIAL LENDING,
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secured loans, over $35 million was paid for environmental assessments in just
one year.329 This lender-enforced system also substantially increases the number
of environmental problems that are corrected. Because businesses and
individuals need to borrow capital, conditioning a loan on an environmental
remediation provides a powerful incentive to the owner to correct the problem.
As with property inspections, these cleanups usually occur without government

intervention. Although increased compliance with environmental laws isavery
desirable public good, it is achieved at the expense of lenders who lose revenue

by refusing to make loans because of an environmental problem and who incur
the costs and delays associated with inspections and corrections.
2. Funding Environmental Protection
In addition to prompting lenders to inspect properties and to require
environmental cleanups, environmental laws have created substantial potential
personal liability for mortgagees to pay for the cost of eliminating pollution and
for injuries suffered as a result of the pollution. A significant source of this
liability is the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA),330 often referred to as "Superfund. ''331 Congress
enacted CERCLA in 1980 in response to the widespread problem of improper
hazardous waste disposal. CERCLA authorizes the government to clean
hazardous waste sites and to recover its costs from the "owner and operator" of
the site, among others, 3 2 or to order them to clean the site.333 The costs of a
cleanup can be substantial. The average cost of a CERCLA cleanup is $30
million, and it can be as much as $100 million. 334 A CERCLA defendant also
can be liable for the injury, destruction, or loss of natural resources,
contamination of neighboring properties, fines, and penalties, 33 and it can be
held liable for the entire amount because CERCLA liability usually is strict,
joint, and several.336

Sept. 1993, at 59, 64, 67.
329. Envtl. Due Diligence (BNA): The Complete Resource Guide, supranote 326,

at 3.
330. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
331. Although "Superfund" is commonly used to refer to the Act, the word more
properly describes the Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund, which helps fund
government response costs under CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9631-9633, repealed by
Superfund Amendments & Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 517(c)(1),
100 Stat. 1613, 1774 (1986).
332. See U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
333. See U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1994).
334. See S. REP. No. 104-185, at 18 (1995), availablein 1995 WL 747809, at *47.
335. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1994).
336. Ann M. Burkhart, Lender/Owners and CERCLA: Title and Liability, 25
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 317, 328 (1988).
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With the potential for such a large judgment, lenders are attractive
CERCLA defendants because they are perceived as having deep pockets.337
Although some courts have been sympathetic to lenders in determining the scope
of their CERCLA liability, other courts have been quite receptive to CERCLA
actions against them. For example, when discussing the justification for
imposing liability on lenders even though they did not cause the pollution, one
court demonstrated an unsympathetic attitude toward lenders: "Mortgagees...
have the means to protect themselves, by making prudent loans. Financial
institutions are in a position to investigate and discover potential problems in
their secured properties. For many lending institutions, such research is routine.
CERCLA will not absolve them from responsibility for their mistakes of
'
judgment."338
The mixed judicial treatment of lender liability, coupled with
ambiguous statutory standards, created a great deal of uncertainty for lenders.
When lenders have been sued as CERCLA defendants, courts have held
them liable under CERCLA both as owners and as operators. A mortgagee can
be liable as an "owner" when it acquired title to the mortgaged property in a
foreclosure action or by means of a deed in lieu of foreclosure.339 A mortgagee
can be liable as an "operator" when it participated in the owner's business
operations.340 One court even held a mortgagee liable as an "operator" because
it appeared to have "the capacity to influence the [owner's] treatment of
hazardous wastes. ' Although other courts have been more restrictive in their
interpretations of CERCLA, lenders' total potential CERCLA liability is
estimated to exceed $100 billion.342
Lenders understandably became quite disturbed by the magnitude of this
potential liability and lobbied vigorously for CERCLA amendments to limit or
eliminate their liability. Congress did amend CERCLA in the Superfund
337. Hearingon S. 651, supra note 311, at 209, 220 (statement of Harris H.
Simmons, representing the American Bankers Assoc.).
338. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 580 (D. Md.
1986) (footnotes omitted).
339. See, e.g., Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 56263 (W.D. Pa. 1989); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573,
577-78 (D. Md. 1986). But see United States v. McLamb, 5 F.3d 69, 72-73 (4th Cir.
1993); Waterville Indus., Inc. v. Finance Auth., 984 F.2d 549, 552-54 (lst Cir. 1993);
United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, 20,995-97 (E.D. Pa.
1985).
340. See, e.g., United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1202-05 (E.D. Pa.
1989).
341. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991).

342. U.S. Asks Supreme Court not to Review Fleet Factors Ruling on CERCLA
Liability, ENVTL. REP. (BNA), Dec. 21, 1990, at 1583. Others have argued that the
burdens on banks have been exaggerated. Amy Dockser Marcus & Amy Stevens, Banks'
Burden in Waste Cleanups is Overstated, According to Study, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11,
1991, at B5.
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Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA). However, Congress
apparently was more concerned with cleaning hazardous waste sites than with
protecting lenders. SARA largely reaffirmed courts' interpretations of
CERCLA's liability provisions. In fact, some commentators have said that a
better acronym for the amendment would be RACHEL-Reauthorization Act
Confirms How Everyone's Liable.343
Ten years later, Congress again amended CERCLA, this time providing a
relatively safe harbor for mortgagees. The amendments closely follow rules that
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) previously had promulgated but
which applied only to actions by EPA and the Department of Justice. 3"
Therefore, the amendments were necessary to protect mortgagees from third
party liability. The amendments specify in some detail the actions that a
mortgagee can take without becoming liable as an "owner and operator," and
Congress was far more generous in defining the permitted actions than some
courts had been. For example, Congress provided that a lender would not be
liable as an "owner" if it purchased the property at its foreclosure sale if the
lender sought to re-sell the property "at the earliest practicable, commercially
reasonable time, on commercially reasonable terms, taking into account market
'
Although this language
conditions and legal and regulatory requirements."345
does not provide concrete guidance to lenders, it certainly leaves a lot of room
to maneuver. Congress also expressly provided that a lender would not be liable
as an "operator" solely because it had the "capacity to influence" the borrower's
operations. 3 " Congress also amended the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA) to provide the same protection to mortgagees when they become
the "owner or operator" of a petroleum underground storage tank.347
The amendments' legislative history and the preamble accompanying the
EPA rules reflect that Congress and EPA had not been particularly moved to
action by a desire to protect lenders, although they must have been motivated at
least in part by intense lender lobbying for clearer standards and greater

343. ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

AND POLICY: NATURE,

LAW, AND SocIETY 279 (1992).

344. Final Rule on Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992).
Although EPA stated that the rule defined the rights of both the government and third

parties, see Fed. Reg. 18,368, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
subsequently held that EPA did not have authority to limit third parties' rights under

CERCLA. Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1107-08 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub
nom., America Bankers Ass'n v. Kelley, 115 S. Ct. 900 (1995). In 1995, EPA and the

Department of Justice (DOJ) issued the Policy on CERCLA Enforcement Against
Lenders and Government Entities that Acquire Property Involuntarily, in which the EPA

and the DOJ stated that they would observe the terms of the 1992 lender liability rule as
their enforcement policy. 60 Fed. Reg. 63,517 (1995).
345. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(E)(ii)(11) (1994).
346. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(F)(i)(1) (1994).
347. 42 U.S.C. § 6991(b)(h)(9) (1994).
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protection from liability. Rather, the legislative history and preamble state that
Congress and EPA were motivated by the necessity of protecting the flow of
capital necessary for funding environmental protections and cleanups.
Confronted with the specter of huge personal liabilities for environmental
cleanups, lenders became more conservative in their lending practices. For
example, most lenders stopped lending against the security of a landfill or waste
disposal site. 4 8 Forty-five percent of lenders stopped making loans to the types
of businesses most frequently associated with pollution, such as service stations,
dry cleaners, and, ironically, recycling facilities.349 Lenders were denying onethird of loan applications for underground storage tanks.350 By 1992, ninety
percent of commercial bankers had refused to make a loan because of concem
that the land offered as security was environmentally contaminated. 351 Lenders
were concerned not just by the potential magnitude of cleanup costs, but also by
the number of contaminated properties. Eight percent of commercial properties
are estimated to require environmental cleanup.352
Although intended to facilitate environmental cleanups, CERCLA and
RCRA were having the opposite effect. Fear of liability caused lenders to refuse
to make loans to those property owners and businesses that pose the greatest
environmental risks. If the owner of a business that produces pollutants cannot
borrow money, it is much less able to install, maintain, and modemize pollution
control technology and otherwise to comply with the environmental laws. 353 If
the land becomes contaminated, a lender will not make a loan to enable the
owner to eliminate the contamination because the lender now knows that the
land is contaminated and, therefore, undesirable security for a loan. 3 4 Moreover,
the lender's knowledge of the pollution would destroy its ability to assert the
"innocent owner" defense provided in CERCLA. Because the only other
defenses to CERCLA liability are an act of God or an act of war, a lender that
loses the innocent owner defense is in an extremely bad position.355
The constriction of credit to those businesses most likely to pollute also
created a potentially greater detrimental effect to environmental protection. If

*47.

348. See 2 Envtl. Due Diligence Guide (BNA) 501:8501.
349. See S. REP. No. 104-185, at 18-19 (1995), availablein 1995 WL 747809, at

350. See Hearingon S. 651, supranote 311, at 212-13 (statement of the American
Bankers Assoc.).
351. See Mortgage Lenders are Pleased with EPA Liability Regulation:
LegislationStill Needed, MORTGAGE MARKETPLACE, May 4, 1992, at 1.
352. See Borrowers ShouldExamine PollutionInsuranceto Ensure that Coverage
is Worth the Cost, MORTGAGE MARKETPLACE, June 29, 1992, at 2.
353. See Hearingon S. 651, supra note 311, at 2 (statement of Senator Jake Gam,
R- Ut.).
354. See Hearingon S. 651, supra note 311, at 214 (statement of the American
Bankers Assoc.).
355. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1), (2) (1994).

1999]

LENDERS AND LAND

business owners cannot afford to purchase and maintain pollution control
technology, producers and servicers of that technology also will suffer. In the
preamble to its new lender liability rule for underground storage tanks (USTs),
EPA clearly expressed its concern about this problem:
The Agency is also concerned that if otherwise credit-worthy UST
owners and operators are unable to obtain financing to perform leak
detection tests, or to upgrade or replace deficient tanks, the market for
UST equipment could be adversely affected, thereby limiting the
availability and/or affecting the cost of such equipment. In addition,
a lack of adequate capital could produce a ripple effect which would
cut across other portions of the UST-related industrial sector for
equipment and services . . . . EPA believes that this sector has
suffered as a direct result of the capital squeeze on UST owners and
operators. The Agency is further concerned that many UST
equipment manufacturers may find it increasingly difficult to sustain
their production of UST equipment. Unnecessary constrictions on the
free flow of capital for UST improvements to meet regulatory
requirements could force companies to abandon their production of
UST equipment or to close altogether, and it may have adverse
impacts on the environment by inhibiting future investment in or
development of new UST technological innovations." 6
This language is representative of the remainder of the preamble and of the
commentary accompanying EPA's CERCLA lender liability rule. For example,
in the EPA Fact Sheet on the Effect of Superfund on Lenders That Hold Security
Interests in Contaminated Property, EPA stated that it was providing some
protection for lenders from CERCLA liability because the existing law was
interfering with efforts to rehabilitate brownfields.357 "Brownfields" are lands
that either are or are perceived as being environmentally contaminated. The
potential for CERCLA liability associated with brownfields inhibits lenders from
advancing the funds necessary for a cleanup or redevelopment. As a result,
contaminated parcels of land may be abandoned, often in an area already
experiencing other forms of urban decay, and pollution-creating industries build
on formerly undeveloped lands. As a result, jobs were lost in urban areas and
polluting activities spread into formerly uncontaminated areas.

356. Underground Storage Tanks - Lender Liability Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 46,692,
46,693 (1995).
357. EPA Fact Sheet on the Effect of Superfund on Lenders that Hold Security
Interests in Contaminated Property (1996), available in 2 Envtl. Due Diligence Guide
(BNA) 501:1161 (1999): "The Lender Policy was issued as part of EPA's Brownfields
Economic Redevelopment Initiative, a series of efforts designed to help states,
communities, and other stakeholders in economic redevelopment to work together in a
timely manner to prevent, assess, safely clean up, and sustainably reuse brownfields."
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EPA's expressed concerns about the negative effects of lender liability on
the availability of capital to enhance environmental protection also is consistent
with the legislative history for the 1996 amendments to CERCLA and RCRA.358
In marked contrast to the first two eras of mortgage law, Congress expressed
little concern about the problems that the laws create for lenders. Although
Congress presumably was influenced by lender lobbying, the written legislative
history focuses on the necessity of reinvigorating the lenders' role in funding
environmental protection, rather than on a concern for the large potential
liabilities confronting lenders.
Additional protection for lenders may be needed to make funds flow in the
amounts necessary to eliminate existing pollution and to prevent additional
pollution from occurring. Although the 1996 amendments limited the potential
for lenders' personal liability under CERCLA and RCRA, they did not eliminate
it, and more than forty states have state counterparts to CERCLA or RCRA that
have not been similarly amended.35 9 A wide variety of other laws also create
potential personal liability for mortgagees, and every environmental law creates
the potential for borrower default and impairment of the loan security. When
formulating policy on the issue of lender liability, an inherent tension exists
between the incentives that potential liability creates for lenders to inspect
properties and to condition loans on environmental remediation and the
disincentives it creates for loans to' those borrowers most likely to pollute.
Legislatures clearly have determined, however, that lenders' best interests must
be subordinated to the public's desire for a cleaner environment.
C. Trends
Although lender liabilities under the environmental and forfeiture laws
break sharply from a long-standing legal tradition of protecting lenders, these
laws are not anomalies in modem America. Rather, lender liability reflects three

relatively recent trends in American law: (1) strict product liability, (2) the
privatization of enforcement, and (3) increased restrictions on private property
rights. With an increasingly populous and complex society, government's
abilities to monitor conduct and to correct harmful conditions, such as pollution,
crime, and decaying inner cities, have been overwhelmed. Therefore,
government is placing more burdens on private individuals to promote the public
good. Some burdens are affirmative-a lender may have to clean a hazardous
waste site or a manufacturer may have to pay damages for injuries from a
product though the manufacturer exercised due care. Other burdens are
negative-property rights are diminished or destroyed. With the pervasive reach
of their lending activities and their relatively large resources, lenders in particular
358. See S. REP. No. 104-185, at 18-19 (1995), availablein 1995 WL 747809 at
*46-*48.
359. See 1 Envtl. Due Diligence Guide (BNA) 101:1 (1999).
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are attractive candidates for helping the government implement a variety of
programs.
1. Strict Product Liability
Lender liability in many ways parallels manufacturers' strict product
liability. Like a manufacturer, a lender may suffer adverse consequences though
it exercised due care. For example, it may lose its mortgage in a forfeiture
action, or the mortgaged land may become worthless because of pollution.
Lender liability also accomplishes many of the same goals as product liability.
Both types of liability (1) create incentives for increased safety controls, (2)
force cost internalization, and (3) increase the likelihood that an injured party
will be compensated.
a. Safety Incentives
Strict product liability is premised on the fact that manufacturers normally
make economically rational decisions about the level of quality control they
implement. By increasing manufacturers' liability for product defects,
manufacturers are motivated to increase their quality controls, thereby
decreasing the frequency and severity of injuries. Lender liability accomplishes
the same goal. Threats of large personal liability, loss of loan security, and an
increased likelihood of borrower default based on enforcement of an
environmental or forfeiture law have caused lenders to exercise increased due
diligence. Lenders have responded to the threat of increased liability by
conducting substantial pre-loan investigations of potential borrowers and of their
land and by monitoring them during the life of the loan. If pollution or criminal
activity is discovered, the lender will refuse to make the loan, though the lender
may permit the owner of polluted land to remediate it in order to get the loan.
Loan documents now routinely include the borrower's express agreement to
refrain from polluting or engaging in illegal conduct on the mortgaged land.
Product liability and lender liability also create an incentive for a more
indirect method of quality control. Strict product liability encourages retailers
to deal only with reputable wholesalers and encourages wholesalers to deal only
with reputable manufacturers and distributors. Similarly, environmental and
forfeiture liabilities encourage lenders to deal only with nonpolluting,
noncriminal borrowers and encourage secondary market purchasers to deal only
with cautious lenders. Over time, less careful manufacturers and borrowers will
have less access to capital and, therefore, will be less able to do harm or will go
out of business.36

360. Although, as noted in the last section of this Article, a polluting business'
inability to obtain credit may be harmful to the environment because the business is less
able to pay for pollution control technologies and cleanups and may be more likely to
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b. CostInternalization
Strict product liability forces manufacturers to internalize the costs of
injuries caused by their goods, rather than leaving those costs with the injured
individuals. When the cost is internalized, the price of the product increases,
which normally decreases consumption. In some cases, the price increase may
be so great that the manufacturer goes out of business or stops selling that
particular product. On the other hand, if the manufacturer continues production
of the injury-producing item, the increased price will spread the cost of the injury
to all who purchase the item and enjoy its benefits.
The environmental and forfeiture laws similarly force lenders to internalize
the costs of polluting or illegal activities that they facilitate by supplying credit.
The lender benefits from the loan payments, including accrued interest,
generated by those polluting or illegal activities. If the lender has to pay
environmental cleanup costs or has to write off a loan because the borrower
cannot repay it and the security interest is worthless, the loss will be spread
across other consumers of credit and services from that lender. If the losses are
sufficiently large, the lender no longer will be competitive in the marketplace
and may even become insolvent. In an attempt to avoid a loss of that magnitude,
lenders routinely impose on borrowers the smaller costs of investigations of the
borrower and of the borrower's land and of environmental insurance for the
lender.
c. IncreasedLikelihood of Compensation
A person injured by a defective product can recover from anyone in the
chain of manufacture and distribution, rather than having recourse only against
the retailer, which may be a small or thinly capitalized operation. With an
expanded pool of defendants, the injured party's chances for recovery are
substantially enhanced. Similarly, the government is more likely to be
compensated in full if it can recover its cleanup costs from the lender, rather than
only from the wrongdoing borrower who may have disappeared, be in prison, or
be insolvent. If the loan has been sold to the secondary market, the government
has an even deeper set of pockets to pursue than a single property owner or
possibly a single neighborhood lender. In the case of a forfeiture, the
government's recovery will be greater if the mortgage encumbering the property
also is forfeited and thereby eliminated from the title.

Although lender liability parallels strict product liability in these three
important ways, lender liability goes a step beyond product liability. As stated
above, product liability applies to each link in the distribution chain between the
manufacturer and the injured party. However, it does not extend further back in

engage in "midnight dumping."
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the chain to reach those who supplied non-defective materials to the
manufacturer. For example, a metal supplier is not liable for a defect in a tool
made with the metal unless it was the source of the defect and not always even
then.36' In the context of lender liability, the lender is analogous to a material
supplier. It supplied capital to the person who created the pollution or performed
the illegal act. Therefore, lender liability is not simply analogous to strict
product liability. Rather, it also reflects a second trend in the law-the
privatization of enforcement.
2. Privatization of Enforcement
As discussed above, the potential losses to lenders from enforcement of the
environmental and forfeiture laws have caused lenders to become a private
police force; lenders investigate borrowers and inspect their lands for evidence
of wrongdoing. Government has begun privatizing enforcement in a variety of
settings to accomplish public goals more comprehensively and efficiently than
would be possible with government enforcement alone. For example, in
Faragherv. City of Boca Raton,362 the United States Supreme Court recently
held that an employer can be liable for sexual harassment committed by its
supervisory personnel. The Court's reasoning reflects a clear intent to enlist
employers' efforts to enforce Title VII's prohibition against employment
discrimination: "It would therefore implement clear statutory policy and
complement the Government's Title VII enforcement efforts to recognize the
employer's affirmative obligation to prevent violations.... . 363 As with lender
liability, employer liability under Title VII has prompted many employers to
enforce the law. They create anti-harassment policies, conduct training sessions,
investigate charges of harassment, and discipline offenders.
Lenders have proven to be a particularly attractive agent for privatized
enforcement. When a prospective borrower needs money, it will consent to an
investigation or to a wide range of other requirements. For that reason, the law
traditionally has been concerned with protecting needy borrowers from
overreaching lenders. But now lenders' leverage over borrowers makes lenders
particularly valuable as enforcement tools, especially because the great majority
of landowners borrow money sometime during their period of ownership.
Therefore, legislatures already have begun imposing significant burdens on
lenders to implement a variety of government programs that are of little or no

361. See EDWARD J. KIONKA, TORTS INA NUTSHELL 228 (2d ed. 1992).
362. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
363. Id. at 2292.
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direct benefit to lenders. For example, lenders already have the following
obligations to advance government programs:
1. To help prevent money laundering and other criminal activities,
lenders must report to the government any currency transaction
exceeding $10,000 in one day,364 any suspected violation of federal65
law, and any suspicious transaction related to money laundering.3
This obligation can be extremely detrimental to a lender's best
interests; by filing these reports, a lender may lose its innocent owner
defense under a forfeiture law because it had self-documented
knowledge of possible criminal activity.
2. The federal Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) 36 requires
lenders to meet the credit needs of their local communities, including
the needs of low and moderate income residents. CRA's primary
purpose is to preserve local communities by eliminating the blight of
decaying neighborhoods, 367 and it has resulted in over $30 billion of
credit to lower income communities. 368 Many legislators support CRA
because it accomplishes this public good without public
expenditure. 369 Lenders, on the other hand, complain that the Act
imposes substantial administrative burdens on them and forces
370 them
to make overly risky and unprofitable extensions of credit.
3. In the wake of massive floods in recent years, federal legislation
now requires lenders to determine whether land offered as collateral
is in a flood hazard area and, if so, to notify the borrower of the flood
hazard, require the borrower to purchase flood insurance, escrow for
flood insurance premium payments if it escrows money for other
purposes, and purchase insurance if the borrower does not.37' A
Senate committee report clearly demonstrates the privatization-ofenforcement purpose for this law. The report states that the law

364. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1998).
365. See 12 C.F.R. § 21.11 (1998).
366. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (1994).
367. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment
Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291, 294, 299 (1993).
368. See Allen J. Fishbein, The Community Reinvestment Act After Fifteen Years:
It Works, But StrengthenedFederalEnforcement is Needed, 20 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 293,
294 (1993).
369. See Macey & Miller, supra note 367, at 343.
370. See Macey & Miller, supra note 367, at 295.
371. See National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108
Stat. 2160, 2255 (1994). See also Leonard A. Bernstein et al., Flood Insurance
"Reform"Act Engulfs Mortgage Lenders, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 304 (1994).
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imposes these duties on lenders to "decrease the. financial impact of
flooding to the federal government, to taxpayers, and to citizens who
are victims of floods."3 72 Because of these public benefits, similar
legislation was introduced in Congress the following year to cover
other natural disasters, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, volcanic
eruptions, windstorms, and tsunamis.3"
Like the intended
beneficiaries of these bills, lenders will benefit from more
comprehensive insurance coverage on mortgaged land. However, if
that benefit outweighed the administrative burden on lenders, they
presumably would have required the insurance, as they do for hazard
insurance, without the necessity of a federally-imposed duty.
4. To help prevent the serious health problems associated with leadbased paint in housing, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) has published a proposed rule that would require
mortgagees both to give information concerning lead-based paint
hazards to certain residential tenants when a loan secured by the
property is refinanced374 and to require appraisers to examine certain
housing offered as collateral for deteriorating lead-based paint.375
Distributing health literature to tenants bears little, if any, relation to
regular lending activities, and requiring additional inspections by
appraisers will increase the cost of lending.
Battling crime, renewing lower income communities, and helping potential
flood victims and tenants are worthwhile goals, but they are public goals. Far
from providing a benefit to lenders, they have increased lenders' costs and
liabilities. A good argument exists that lending institutions have a duty to the
public because the public has benefitted them in many ways. The savings and
loan bailout is just one, particularly vivid example. However, this burdening of
lenders does represent a significant change from the centuries during which the
law was primarily concerned with protecting lenders' interests.

372. S.REP.No. 103-169, at 195 (1994), reprintedin 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1881,
2025.
373. Representative Bill Emerson (R-MO) introduced H.R. 1856, the Natural
Disaster Protection Partnership Act. Senators Ted Stevens (R-AK) and Daniel Inouye
(D-HI) introduced S. 1043, the Natural Disaster Protection and Insurance Act.
374. 61 Fed. Reg. 29,170, 29,210 (1996), to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 36.84
(proposed Jun. 7, 1996).
375. 61 Fed. Reg. 29,170, 29,210 (1996), to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 36.86
(proposed Jun. 7, 1996).
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3. Restrictions on Private Property Rights
The swinging of the legal pendulum from protection of private property
rights to protection of the public good is not limited to mortgagees. In this way,

lender liability reflects a third trend in the law. Wetlands regulations and
endangered species habitat protection are just two examples of the ways in which
private owners' use of their land has been burdened for the public good within
the relatively recent past. Regulatory infringements on private property rights
have occurred so frequently in recent years that a strong private property rights
movement has arisen in response. Just since 1991, this movement has been
responsible for legislation in twenty-five states that provide a variety of
protections for landowners from the effects of government regulation.376 The
movement also has been successful in prompting Congress to consider private
property rights legislation several times during the past few years.377
These modem infringements on private property rights are not unique in
American law. Despite claims by the private property rights movement that
government intrusions on ownership have reached unprecedented levels, 378 the
law has afforded greater or lesser degrees of protection for private property
rights throughout our history. For example, before the Revolution and into the
nineteenth century, most states did not compensate landowners for property
taken for roads and other public uses.379 Similarly, during the years preceding
the Civil War, courts limited the scope of nuisance law to protect railroads from
actions for property damages by neighboring landowners.3 "
A crucial distinction exists, however, between the current cycle of
government intrusion on private property rights and earlier cycles. In earlier
times, the impetus for these intrusions was economic development. By making
roads and railroads cheaper to build, for example, America could be developed
more quickly. Railroads and other industries were the primary beneficiaries of
these changes in the law, though the public also clearly benefitted. In contrast,
today's restrictions impede development by creating liabilities for lenders. As
a result of these liabilities, lenders are more cautious in extending credit,
especially to industry. Despite this effect, however, government may be

376. See Harvey M. Jacobs, The Impact of State Property Rights Laws: Those
Laws andMy Land, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Mar. 1998, at 3, 3.
377. Most recently, Congress considered the Omnibus Property Rights Act of
1997 (S. 781), which was designed to establish a new federal process for protecting
property owners' rights. The Senate considered a similar bill in 1995 (S. 605), and the
House of Representatives passed sweeping takings legislation that year (H.R. 925).
During the 1990s, Congress also has considered a variety of other bills designed to
protect private property rights. See Jacobs, supra note 371, at 3.
378. See Jacobs, supra note 371, at 6.
379. See MORTON J. HORwITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-

1860, at 63 (1977).
380. See id. at 70-71.
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expected to continue enlisting lenders' efforts and resources for a variety of
programs in the future because lenders have proven to be an effective adjunct to
the government's efforts to contain pollution, crime, and a variety of other
societal problems.
IV. CONCLUSION

Despite the direct line of development from the twelfth-century mortgage
to the modem mortgage, lenders' relationship with mortgaged land has changed
dramatically over time. Under the earliest forms of land security, the lender took
possession of the land, collected its income with no duty to account to the
borrower, enjoyed the legal rights associated with land ownership, and kept the
land if the borrower defaulted regardless of the land's value in relation to the
debt. These rights are unimaginable today. However, they had the effect of
creating a close relationship between the lender and the land. As a possessor and
possible owner, the lender had strong incentives to become familiar with the
land, particularly because the lender was personally liable for its condition.
During this first era of mortgage law, the law focused on providing enhanced
protection for the lender's rights in the land.
In marked contrast, during the second era of mortgage law, lenders became
further and further removed from the land. When England made the transition
from feudalism to mercantilism, the debt assumed primary importance in the
loan relationship. At the same time that the law provided increasing protections
for the lender's rights with respect to the debt, equity chipped away at the
lender's rights in the land until the mortgage properly was characterized as a
mere lien. The lien enables the lender to sell the land to satisfy the debt but no
more. The focus on the debt and the income stream that it represents has
accelerated in modem times as debts and mortgages are securitized and sold to
investors around the world who have never seen the mortgaged land, much less
taken an active interest in it.
Today, in the third era of mortgage law, mortgagees again face significant
liabilities as a result of their interest in the mortgaged land. Unlike the first era,
their liabilities do not arise from possession of the land. They result instead from
government efforts to address societal problems, such as crime, pollution, and
the decay of the inner cities. Because virtually every parcel of privately owned
land is mortgaged at some time, lenders are uniquely situated to help implement
government programs at little or no cost to the government. For this reason,
while the first two eras of mortgage law were characterized by the law's
increasing protections for lenders, the hallmark of the third era may prove to be
the law's increasing burdens for lenders to further the public good.

